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FIFA, football's (or soccer's, as it is known in some countries) world 
governing body, has long been associated with the World Cup and, lately, 
the corruption scandal.  Less known is FIFA's success in building a legal 
order that competes with public orders.  This study explains how and why 
this private legal order has succeeded in governing the behavior of the 
involved actors by keeping them away from regular courts.  We argue that 
the ability of the order to offer what other governance modes could not is 
the key: FIFA, as a transnational private authority, offers harmonized 
institutions that apply across national borders and in many cases are 
better accustomed to the needs of the involved parties than their state-
made alternatives, which often are based on one-size-fits-all approach and 
lack certainty of application.  FIFA's rules increase the gains of clubs and 
prominent footballers.  And while the interests of some other involved 
parties, less known players in particular, might have been better served by 
the application of formal state laws, the established equilibrium 
discourages deviation.  The results contribute to the better understanding 
of alternative modes of supplying institutional design, particularly by 
illustrating how private orders function in the environment where 
reputation plays limited role. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association, better-
known as FIFA, is the governing body for football (or soccer, as it is 
known in some countries), futsal, and beach soccer.1  Founded in 1904 
under Swiss law by seven European countries—Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland—and based in 
Zurich, Switzerland, currently it comprises 211 national associations.2  
Although FIFA's most important objective is staging major tournaments,3 
particularly the FIFA World Cup, it has gone further by creating common 
rules of behavior for thousands of parties—players, clubs, coaches, their 
representatives, investors, sponsors of tournaments, and even spectators of 
the beautiful game.4  These rules, given FIFA's reach, cover almost the 
entire globe and pretty much every essential football tournament. 
FIFA, however, is not the only private actor that has established its 
own legal order.  Scholars have documented numerous examples—both 
historical, such as private prosecution associations during the Industrial 
1. See FIFA, FIFA STATUTES, REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTES, AND STANDING ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS, art. 6.1 (football), art. 6.4 (futsal), art. 
47 (beach soccer) (2015), available at http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/ 
generic/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatutesen_neutral.pdf [hereinafter FIFA STATUTES]. 
2. See http://www.fifa.com/associations/ (listing all current FIFA members).
3. Additionally, FIFA aims to improve and promote the game of football.  See FIFA
STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 2 (a), (b).
4. See id., art. 2 (c) (one of the FIFA's objectives is "to draw up regulations and
provisions and ensure their enforcement").  See also FIFA, FIFA REGULATIONS ON THE STATUS 
AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS (2015), available at 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/70/95/52/regulationssta
tusandtransfer_2015_e_v051015_neutral.pdf [hereinafter TRANSFER REGULATIONS] (laying 
down rules concerning the status of players, their eligibility to participate in organized football, 
and their transfer between clubs belonging to different member associations); FIFA, 
REGULATIONS ON WORKING WITH INTERMEDIARIES (2015), available at 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/02/36/77/63/regulationson
workingwithintermediariesii_neutral.pdf (establishing rules for the professional representatives 
of players and clubs whose services can be engaged when concluding an employment contract 
or a transfer agreement); FIFA, REGULATIONS: CLUB LICENSING (2007), available at 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/67/17/66/club_licensing_r
egulations_en_47341.pdf [hereinafter LICENSING REGULATIONS] (defining minimum 
requirements for the licensing of clubs by national member associations, including restrictions 
on the ownership of football clubs); FIFA, FIFA DISCIPLINARY CODE (2011), available at 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/75/discoinhalte.pdf 
[hereinafter DISCIPLINARY CODE] (e.g., authorizing banning fans from entering a stadium for 
infringements of the rules in FIFA regulations). 
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Revolution in England,5 early attempts of self-regulation by American 
securities traders under the helm of the New York Stock and Exchange 
Board (renamed in 1863 to the New York Stock Exchange),6 or medieval 
merchant guilds7 and pirate organizations,8 and contemporary, such as 
small local communities9 or business associations10—where non-state 
actors develop institutions that support order.  These privately-created 
legal orders often function successfully in the shadow of or without state-
made laws.  What clearly distinguishes FIFA's private legal order, which 
is distinctly law-like, from many other examples, is, most notably, its stark 
contrast with state-made laws in some fields.  The controversy has focused 
on, inter alia, the compatibility of the regime with the freedom to choose 
employment, competition laws, and free movement rules of the European 
Union.11 
This study aims to explain how and why this private legal order has 
succeeded in governing the behavior of the involved actors by keeping 
them away from regular courts.  We propose that the ability of the order 
to offer what other governance modes could not is the key: FIFA, as a 
transnational private authority, offers harmonized institutions that apply 
across national borders and in many cases are better accustomed to the 
needs of the involved parties than their state-made alternatives, which 
often are based on one-size-fits-all approach and lack certainty of 
application.  FIFA's rules increase the gains of clubs and prominent 
footballers.  And while the interests of some other involved parties, less 
known players in particular, might have been better served by the 
application of formal state laws, the established equilibrium discourages 
5. See Mark Koyama, Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England:
Private Providers of Public Goods?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2012). 
6. See Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 113 (1998). 
7. See Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, & Barry R. Weingast, Coordination, Commitment,
and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POLIT. ECON. 745 (1994). 
8. See PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES
(2009). 
9. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991). 
10. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter The Diamond 
Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter 
The Cotton Industry]. 
11. See infra Part IV.A (describing challenges to FIFA's private legal order from public
law). 
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deviation.  Further, we identify factors that, notwithstanding alleged 
contradictions with formal state-made law, contributed to the rise of this 
private legal order. 
One of the contributions of this article lies in illustrating how private 
ordering evolves and functions in the setting where reputation plays 
limited role.  Most prior studies of private legal orders share a similar 
underlying structure: reputation-based mechanisms—either independently 
or in combination with more formal mechanisms—induce parties to 
behave in a manner beneficial to the parties and other members of a 
group.12  We consider a case where an extremely big number of the 
involved actors and the absence of entry and exit barriers weaken 
reputation mechanisms.  Although information about opportunistic 
behavior can be monitored and communicated easily among the actors, 
collective punishment is not guaranteed.  Hence, bad reputation does not 
necessarily lead to ostracism.  We show that private legal orders can 
function without reputation-based mechanisms.  This, however, 
necessitates a different structure.  In order to be successful, a coordinated 
system of privately-designed rules, dispute resolution venues, and 
enforcement mechanisms emerge.  This public order-like system is 
supported by a strong member association which performs a role similar 
to the position of a government in a public order. 
One last point that needs to be addressed here is the clarification of 
the meaning of norms (rules) supplied by private actors.  Since FIFA is a 
centralized private organization, this article focuses mainly on formal, 
centralized private rules of governance, rather than on societal norms.  We 
contrast these rules with state-made legal rules.13 
The rest of this article is organized as follows.  Part II briefly 
discusses the role of decentralized self-governance and centralized 
governance by private organizations in supporting cooperation.  This part 
also proposes FIFA as an organization that has developed its own private 
legal order for governing football-related matters: an order that co-exists 
in parallel with formal state-made law.  Part III puts forward the how 
question: how does FIFA organize the world of football and keep involved 
actors out of state courts?  Part IV briefly discusses challenges to the 
12. See infra Part II (describing conditions for creating cooperation by both decentralized
and centralized private ordering). 
13. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 351 (1997) (treating both societal norms and organizational rules of 
centralized private organizations as privately-designed norms, as long as the distinction between 
their supply by decentralized and centralized means is observed). 
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FIFA's order from formal state-made law.  Part V then proceeds to the why 
question: why is the organized football subject to FIFA's rules and 
institutions rather than alternative governance structures in general and 
formal state law in particular?  We answer this question by identifying 
factors that increase the costs of other means of governance and thus make 
them no viable option.  Under these circumstances, FIFA offers supportive 
institutions for governance that others fail to provide.  Some of these 
factors are not football-specific.  Hence, it is reasonable to expect that 
other groups can benefit from organizing a similar private order as well.  
In part VI, we discuss the reasons that contributed to the success of FIFA 
in building its own private legal order.  At the end, we offer some 
conclusions. 
II. THE THEORY OF PRIVATE MODES OF GOVERNANCE
Several governance mechanisms provide institutional support for 
economic activity: markets, firms, states, or communities and private 
group organizations.14  Obviously, none has a monopoly.  For example, 
where a state is not able or willing to provide institutions, alternative 
private modes of governance can fill the gaps.15  These instances include 
mostly historical examples, which predated modern state institutions, 
present-day cases from developing countries, where institutions are weak, 
or illegal activities, which certainly cannot be supported by formal law.16  
Indeed, such private orders might be inferior to the centralized provision 
of reliable institutions by states, but in the absence of state action even 
such substandard alternatives create economic value.17 
The situation is different where one mode of governance competes 
with an already existing order for organizing specific activities.  In this 
case, the least-cost method will be chosen from among the available 
institutions.18  The question about the preferred source of governance then 
boils down to the ability of a certain governance mode to offer rules that 
14. See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1754
(1996). 
15. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF 
GOVERNANCE 3–4 (2004); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under 
Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2448–53 (2000). 
16. See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a
Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2335–36 (2004). 
17. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 15, at 2425.
18. DIXIT, supra note 15, at 4.
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suffer the least from market failures.19  If private ordering is preferred to 
formal state law, there is a strong case that the private order better suits the 
needs of the involved actors.20  This favored position flows largely from 
the proximity of private associations to the involved actors which leads to 
two advantages.  One is informational advantage in designing specialized 
rules of behavior and resolving the arising disputes in swift, qualified, and 
maybe even less costly manner.21  Another is the responsiveness of the 
order to the special needs of the involved actors owing to the greater 
involvement of the latter in the formation of the rules.22 
Certainly, privately designed institutions are not necessarily the 
most efficient from the perspective of maximizing social welfare 
(consider, for example, negative externalities they may create for third 
parties).23  They also do not undoubtedly imply maximum individual gains 
for all involved actors, because the development and maintenance of such 
orders may be the result of efforts by specific power groups (speaking of 
influential interest groups, state capture is not uncommon either).24  
19. See Katz, supra note 14, at 1753–55 (showing that the question about the best
governance mode depends on possible costs of supplying institutions, among which are 
externalities, informational asymmetries, strategic behavior, network and learning externalities). 
20. Surely, path dependency, collective action problems, and other factors might deter a
shift from a bad equilibrium to a better one.  We discuss factors contributing to the maintenance 
of an established equilibrium below.  See infra notes 210–219 and accompanying text. 
21. See DIXIT, supra note 15, at 32–48 (showing the advantages of private contract
enforcement, whether by the parties and industry peers based on relational contracting or by 
arbitration, as opposed to a state law that must use worse public information); Bernstein, The 
Cotton Industry, supra note 10, at 1741 (arguing that insider information available to arbitrators 
transforms considerations that in the public legal system would have been only observable to 
the parties into considerations that are also verifiable, thereby expanding the "contractible" 
aspects of an exchange and making contracts more complete); David Charny, Nonlegal 
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 409 (1990) (the same). 
22. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697,
1700–01 (1996) (contrasting the ability of private ordering to accommodate the interests of the 
governed to the less responsive nature of centralized rule-making). 
23. See Robert C. Ellickson, When Civil Society Uses an Iron Fist: The Roles of Private
Associations in Rulemaking and Adjudication, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235, 253 (2016) (listing 
the collective action problem and the pursuit of ends other than economic efficiency along with 
negative externalities as explanations for the existence of non-efficient private orders); Maria 
Larrain & Jens Prüfer, Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions, 7 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 467, 486–91 (showing formally that when property rights are weakly protected by 
the state, private trade associations increase welfare by lobbying for stronger property rights; 
contrary, when property rights are strong, trade associations engage in rent-seeking which leads 
to negative spillovers); Posner, supra note 22, at 1722–23 (discussing the negative externality 
argument). 
24. See Posner, supra note 22, at 1718–19.  See also Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, & 
Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture and Influence in Transition 
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Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that private orders increase the 
collective gains of the involved actors relative to other available 
governance mechanisms, including a public ordering regime.25  In other 
words, private orders can offer organizational support that other 
competing alternatives, due to high transaction costs, struggle to provide.26  
Otherwise, the private order would lose the race in the competition with 
formal state law and other alternatives, as dissatisfied actors have strong 
incentives to challenge its validity referring to the order's incompatibility 
with mandatory state laws and public order concerns.27 
There are two possible ways for actors to opt out of the existing 
governance modes in favor of a private ordering.  First, self-enforcing 
governance systems (self-governance) can organize behavior in 
reputation-based networks.28  Second, private third parties can step in the 
role of the state and offer privately-designed rules for governing the 
behavior of their members on a coordinated basis (governance by private 
associations).29  Numerous case studies demonstrate the ways how the two 
modes work independently or in interaction.30  These studies, along with 
Economies, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 751, 758 (2003) (ranking 22 post-Communist countries by the 
level of state capture by influential private businesses). 
25. The concept of "relative efficiency" should be distinguished from the argument that
group norms tend to maximize the welfare of the group in which they arise.  The latter has been 
advanced by Robert Ellickson.  See ELLICKSON, supra note 9, at 167.
26. See Richman, supra note 16, at 2338–50 (explaining that the choice of a governance
mode depends on its relative superiority in offering effective and cheap enforcement, market 
entry, and high-powered incentives); Barak D. Richman, Norms and Law: Putting the Horse 
Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 762–64 (2012) (the same).  Various examples of private 
orders often outperform public orders and firms in enforcement and market incentives, 
respectively, but limit market access.  Hence, a private order arises where the effects of entry 
barriers associated with reputation mechanisms are insignificant or the order can offer methods 
for strengthening access without compromising the credibility of the order.  See Richman, supra 
note 16, at 2346–47.  One such method described by Richman is ex ante screening of new 
entrants.  Id. at 2347.  Our case study shows that not all private legal orders are reputation based.  
Such orders can effectively function even if they involve a large number of heterogeneous actors. 
27. As already mentioned, it is possible that costly institutions persist even though
efficiency requires changes.  According to Douglas North, the two main reasons to blame are 
the powerful vested interests of some actors or multiple equilibria and historical accidents.  See 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 92–104 (1990). 
28. See DIXIT, supra note 15, at 12–13.
29. See id. at 13.
30. The early literature is classified in McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 15, at 2435 (for
spontaneous self-governing private orders), 2444 (for organized private orders).  More recent 
examples of uncoordinated self-governing mechanisms of private ordering include the practice 
of contracting in Hollywood (see Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for 
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more recent theoretical work, reveal the necessary conditions for the 
functioning of either of the two modes of private ordering. 
A. Private Ordering by Decentralized Self-Governance
Self-governing decentralized systems are found in two different 
environments: where the same actors interact with each other repeatedly 
(bilateral interactions) or where actors meet different counterparties each 
time, but they all belong to a homogenous group (multilateral 
interactions).  Under repeated interactions between the same parties, direct 
reciprocity can discipline the parties and discourage them from taking 
short-term opportunistic actions.  But in order to work effectively, certain 
minimum conditions should be met: (1) the parties should have sufficient 
regard for the future (long-term gains of cooperation must exceed the 
payoffs of opportunistic actions and the parties should be certain about the 
continuation of the relationship); (2) any deviation should be detected 
quickly and accurately in order to impose punishments in time and 
correctly; and (3) the parties should be willing to punish, costly though it 
may be, the deviating actors.31 
However, often actors interact with different parties, rather than 
meet the same counterparty each time.  The small likelihood of bilateral 
dealings weakens the disciplinary effect of direct reciprocity.32  In such 
situations, self-governance is viable only if an actor's opportunistic 
behavior can lead to future costs for him/her through interactions with 
other non-affected actors belonging to the same group.33  In other words, 
if sanctions cannot be imposed by the affected party directly, the entire 
collective must participate in punishing the deviating actor.  This will 
Hard Markets, 64 DUKE L.J. 605 (2015)), cooperation between large US mid-western original 
equipment manufacturers and their suppliers (see Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: 
Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 
(2015)), the relationships of investment banks with their clients (see Alan D. Morrison & 
William J. Wilhelm Jr., Trust, Reputation, and Law: The Evolution of Commitment in Investment 
Banking, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 363 (2015)), and the means of protecting copyright in stand-up 
comedy (see Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1787 (2008)).  For the recent studies of governance by private associations see, e.g., 
Ellickson, supra note 23, at 254–261 (discussing the role of various strong membership
associations in coordinating the behavior of actors).
31. DIXIT, supra note 15, at 60–61.
32. Id. at 63.
33. Id.
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transform breach of contract as to one party into breach of contract as to 
numerous actors involved in the industry, thereby increasing the 
magnitude of the expected penalty.34  Accordingly, two additional 
necessary conditions should be present: (4) information about wrongful 
acts has to be conveyed—typically through gossip—to all other actors in 
the group;35 and (5) all group members have to be interested in imposing 
and enforcing sanctions against the deviating actor, even though this might 
mean forgoing mutually beneficial actions with him/her.36  Gossips about 
wrongful acts and imposed sanctions help refining the meaning of the 
norms of behavior within the group.37  Without developing common 
understanding as to what constitutes a wrongful act, group norms cannot 
support cooperation.38 
34. See Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 10, at 1764.
35. See DIXIT, supra note 15, at 63–64.
36. See id.  Incentives for collective punishment can be material, psychological, or a
combination of both.  For example, in medieval Iceland, if a person failed to comply with the 
court order, he/she could be declared an outlaw.  Once declared an outlaw, anyone might punish 
the offender by taking the offender's property.  This material incentive supported broad 
participation in collective punishment.  See David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement 
of Law: A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 405 (1979); Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. 
Weingast, Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized 
Collective Punishment, 1 J. L. & COURTS 3, 13 (2013).  Another example is the community 
responsibility system described by Avner Greif.  According to Greif, prior to the 13th century, 
when communities were relatively small and homogeneous, a host community would punish all 
members of a foreign community if any merchant from the foreign community cheated the 
members of the host community and the foreign community failed to discipline this behavior.  
This threat provided members in each community with the incentives to police the behavior of 
all merchants in their own community.  See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO 
THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 310 (2006).  Other scholars focus 
on psychological factors to explain human behavior in groups.  For example, group members 
are likely to behave in the group's collective interest, even though such behavior is costly, if they 
believe that other members in the group behave similarly.  Thus, the desire of individuals to 
contribute to public goods may become stronger or weaker depending whether others are 
contributing or not.  See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to 
Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 364–65 (2003).  Lastly, a combination of monetary 
and non-monetary benefits can explain the ability of private groups to provide public goods.  See 
Koyama, supra note 5, at 114–15 (explaining the rise of the private associations for the
prosecution of criminals in England during the period between 1750 and 1850, in addition to 
material incentives such associations offered to their members, by the desire the association 
members had for the esteem of others). 
37. See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2256–27 (1996) (comparing the role of gossip in close-knit social groups to that of 
common law courts: gossip applies the general social norm to the particular situation, thereby 
clarifying its exact meaning). 
38. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 542 (1993) (explaining that credible 
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The size of the group affects its ability to meet the two additional 
conditions.  The larger the group, the weaker information dissemination 
mechanisms are.39  Accordingly, instances of cheating counterparties are 
not always reflected in the reputation of an actor.  Large groups also pose 
complications for collective punishment of wrongdoers.40  Not only do 
they face coordination problems, but may include free-riding members 
who refuse to incur the costs of punishing others, for example, by not 
willing to give away potential profit-making transactions with the 
wrongdoers.41  Thus, deviations from the established rules of behavior may 
go unpunished.  The anticipation of these problems weakens incentives to 
cooperate in the first place.42  In addition to size, homogeneity in the group 
collective punishment requires a definition of "cheating" that ensures collective response); 
Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal 
Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 1010–12 (2016) (explaining how 
detailed business contracts, which the parties do not intend to enforce formally, support 
cooperation by coordinating the interpretation of various acts and events); W. Bentley MacLeod, 
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 596 (2007) (noting 
the importance of a mutual understanding of the events that determine contract breach in 
ensuring reputation-based cooperation). 
39. See Charny, supra note 21, at 418–19 (proposing that collective reputational
enforcement should work well in small groups; conversely, mass markets based on reputational 
bonds are feasible only with technology that conveys information cheaply to a large group of 
actors); Strahilevitz, supra note 36, at 365 (pointing out that reputation mechanisms may weaken 
when relied upon outside small groups, but explaining that the mechanisms of successful 
cooperation depend primarily on the group members' ability to observe and share information 
about others' behavior, rather than on the group's size). 
40. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 49–52, 53–56 (1965) (showing that size is one of the key factors affecting 
the ability of groups to promote common interests of their members: small groups have an 
advantage). 
41. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 15, at 2429.  Incentives for free-riding do not
arise if sanctioning wrongdoers is not costly.  See McAdams, supra note 13, at 358–65 (offering 
the theory that social norms arise because people seek the esteem of others; because withholding 
or granting esteem is costless, violations of norms can be easily sanctioned, thereby leading to 
their development). 
42. As mentioned above, collective punishment can be supported by the tendency of
human beings to act in the common interest if others are behaving cooperatively.  See supra note 
36. If this is the case, then the collective action problem goes away.  Hence, promoting trust,
rather than material incentives, can support cooperation.  Moreover, material incentives
supposed to encourage behavior in the interests of the group may backfire by eroding trust,
thereby removing the psychological motives to cooperate.  See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 338 (2001) (explaining the negative effect of material
incentives on voluntary contributions to public goods by signaling that individuals are not likely
to cooperate voluntarily and by concealing information about the real motives of cooperation);
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV.
71, 76–77 (2003) (the same).
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will affect communication networks and enforcement mechanisms in a 
group.  For example, information flows better in networks that are 
connected by business ties43 or ethnicity.44  Similarly, high costs of entry 
into another ethnic community increase the value of belonging to one's 
own community, thereby stipulating loyalty and rule-compliance.45 
B. Centralized Governance by Private Associations
The failures of decentralized self-governing mechanisms of 
cooperation can be corrected by private governance groups.  First, private 
groups can extend cooperation by creating formal channels of 
communication that foster accurate distribution of information among all 
interested members of the group.46  Second, if the mere provision of 
accurate information about wrongful actions is not enough to impose self-
organized collective punishments on wrongdoers, private associations can 
assist in coordinating collective punishment.47  For instance, the failure to 
43. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 10, at 140–41 (1992); Bernstein,
The Cotton Industry, supra note 10, at 1751–52. 
44. See Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 879 (1989) (explaining the retention of a separate 
social identity of the 11th-century Maghribi traders within the larger Jewish communities by 
their desire to have a closed homogeneous network for the transmission of information inside 
the group); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An 
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 359–60 (1981) (contrasting 
higher costs in searching for information regarding potential counterparties across ethnic 
boundaries with lower costs of informal communication within the trader's own ethnic 
community); James E. Rauch, Business and Social Networks in International Trade, 39 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1177, 1182, 1184–88 (2001) (presenting evidence that ethnic networks improve both the 
transmission of information regarding past opportunistic conduct and about current 
opportunities for profitable cooperation); James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, Ethnic Chinese 
Networks in International Trade, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 116, 122–26 (2002) (the same). 
45. See Landa, supra note 44, at 356 (explaining that "outsiders" may substitute good
reputation for kinship/ethnic status; but because reputation building, unlike obtaining status 
rights, is costly, members of an ethnically homogeneous group have strong incentives to 
preserve their status by abiding to the rules of the community).  Avner Greif made a similar 
argument later in his study of the practices of the 11th-century Maghribi traders.  See Greif, 
supra note 44, at 867–68; Greif, supra note 38, at 539. 
46. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 15, at 2427 (explaining that private
organizations not only collect and store information, but also reduce the likelihood of mistakes 
in the transmission of this information in large groups); Jens Prüfer, Business Associations and 
Private Ordering, 32 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 321–22, 335 (2016) (formally showing how 
membership in private business associations improves on social networks by facilitating more 
cooperation between weakly connected actors; social networks, on the other hand, are better 
suited for situations where cooperating actors have strong informal connections). 
47. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 15, at 2429–30.
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participate in collective punishment can itself be subject to punishment.48  
Third, organized institutions can also facilitate common classification of 
acts, for example, by defining the terms of the agreement between the 
parties or distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable behavior.49 
The historical narrative of diamond trade illustrates the functioning 
of self-enforcing mechanisms of cooperation which are assisted by a the 
organized regional membership associations of diamond dealers.  Given 
industry-specific factors, formal courts face complications in enforcing 
contracts between diamond traders and various middlemen.50  This failure 
can be corrected by reputation-based trade as long as the same actors deal 
with each other repeatedly and the benefits of cooperation for both parties 
exceed the one-time gain of cheating.  Yet, the trade is multilateral 
involving many different actors; moreover, extreme rewards of cheating, 
given the price of stones, can be well above of the benefits of long-term 
cooperation.51  A combination of industry and community institutions 
dealt with these challenges.  While industry institutions—the membership 
association of diamond dealers and its arbitration panel—facilitated the 
exchange of reputational information among the actors,52 long-term family 
reputations53 and community institutions54 removed the incentives to 
48. See DIXIT, supra note 15, at 63–64; McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 15, at 2440.
See also Prüfer, supra note 46, at 331–32, 335 (showing the conditions under which business 
associations that offer arbitration services can broaden the scope of cooperation as opposed to 
social networks).  In general, a collective action problem can be solved by selective incentives 
which can be either negative or positive, in that they can either punish actors that fail to act in 
the interests of the group or offer benefits to those who act in the group's interests.  See OLSON, 
supra note 40, at 51. 
49. See Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 10, at 1771–74; Hadfield & Weingast,
supra note 36, at 8–9. 
50. See Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage:
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 390–92 (2006) 
(explaining the inability of formal law to support diamond trade, which heavily relies on credit 
sales, because of wide opportunities to cheat by hiding unpaid-for or stolen diamonds from law 
enforcement officials). 
51. See id. at 393–94.
52. See id. at 396–97 (describing information exchange mechanisms such as rumors
within the association and official publication of information about members for members). 
53. See id. at 400–04 (showing that the main diamond traders belonged to families with 
long histories in the industry which extended beyond the limited lifespan of an individual trader; 
limited entry for traders without family connections and the risk of expulsion of all traders from 
a family with a damaged reputation leveraged the value of reputation). 
54. See id. at 404–07 (showing that small independent contractors, such as diamond
brokers and cutters, were the members of ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities which put 
collective efforts to ensure that community members complied with their contractual 
obligations). 
THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER OF FIFA 
14 
deviate from cooperation.55  Similar structure is observed in the cotton 
industry.56 
C. Private Governance in the World of Football
The conditions for self-governance are not always met in the world 
of professional football.  The relationships between the football-related 
actors cannot be continued forever.  While clubs have separate legal 
identity distinct from their members (shareholders) and players, and thus 
have unlimited existence, the career durations of footballers is restricted 
in time.  As a result, the actors can predict accurately the end of the 
interaction: the closer the end date, the stronger their incentives to act 
opportunistically are. 
In addition, football clubs and players deal with different partners at 
different times and the sheer size of the group impedes disciplining 
infringers by collective reciprocity.  Although contracts between clubs or 
between clubs and players are typically confidential, there is lot of media 
coverage of these transactions, their conditions, internal environment in 
clubs, and personal life of star players.57  These information flows, 
although sometimes leaked strategically and with limited reliability, are 
instrumental for the functioning of reputation-based disciplining 
mechanisms.58  The ability of clubs and players to learn of the prior 
behavior of their counterparties coupled with constrained exit (given 
FIFA's monopoly power), creates potential conditions for the functioning 
of decentralized collective punishment.  Nevertheless, the extremely large 
55. Market, technological, and cultural developments have eroded trust in the diamond
industry recently and have led to the decline of the industry's famous private ordering system.  
See Barak D. Richman, An Autopsy of Cooperation: Diamond Dealers and the Limits of Trust-
Based Exchange (Apr. 13, 2016), at 41–42, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2764470. 
56. See Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 10, at 1745–54 (describing reputation-
based non-legal sanctions in the cotton industry and the role of centralized industry institutions 
in supporting their effective functioning). 
57. For example, the specialist German-based website TransferMarkt 
(www.transfermarkt.com) reports almost all actual or likely transfer fees paid by clubs for 
signing players. 
58. See Strahilevitz, supra note 36, at 365 (noting that reputation mechanisms can remain
effective even in large loose-knit groups if the involved actors receive accurate and necessary 
information).  Many online peer-to-peer platforms, like eBay and Airbnb, have created 
sophisticated review mechanisms that smoothen information flows between the users and 
facilitate cooperation in extremely large groups.  See Liran Einav, Chiara Farronato, & Jonathan 
D. Levin, Peer-to-Peer Markets, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 615, 620–22 (2016); Tamar Frankel,
Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457, 471 (2001).
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number of the involved actors in football generates strong incentives for 
opportunistic behavior.  Even if information about bad reputations is 
available, the solidarity among the actors is not strong.59  Accordingly, 
there will always be clubs and players willing to benefit from cooperating 
with the wrongdoers.60  Actors can try to sustain bilateral relations in order 
to be able to discipline each other by direct reciprocity, but this limits the 
scope of their trading opportunities.61 
Instead of an elaborate dispute resolution and enforcement systems, 
theoretically FIFA could have established formal mechanisms for rating 
the behavior of football-related actors and sharing the results with every 
interested party.  Bad reputation of an actor would have lowered the 
likelihood of being approached by others, thereby encouraging 
compliance with the rules and contractual obligations.  However, the 
presence of collective action and free-rider problems casts doubts whether 
the "alternative FIFA" (in the capacity of an information intermediary) 
could have equivalently substituted the "present-day FIFA" (in its capacity 
as an arbiter and enforcer). 
The lack of reputation-based non-legal sanctions is compensated by 
stronger formal rules of behavior designed by FIFA, a private 
organization.  In the absence of the conditions making relation-based self-
governance possible, private ordering in football takes place with the help 
of a strong member association that supplies common rules of behavior, 
considers disputes arising from this behavior, and imposes sanctions to 
enforce its decisions.62  FIFA thus, similar to a formal state, plays a 
59. See generally Timothy W. Guinnane, A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen's
Credit Cooperatives in Ireland, 1894–1914, 31 EXPL. ECON. HIST. 38, 56 (1994) (explaining 
the failed effort to transplant German credit cooperatives to Ireland by the reluctance of Irish 
people, as opposed to Germans, to force their neighbors to repay loans or face adverse 
consequences). 
60. Scholars have shown that the increase in the distance or dissimilarity between actors
reduces the reliability of community institutions in enforcing contracts and calls for their 
replacement with formal courts and enforcement mechanisms.  See Scott E. Masten & Jens 
Prüfer, On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement Institutions: Communities and Courts, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 359, 367–74 (2014).  They attribute this need to the increased information distance 
between the interacting actors.  In modern societies, information technologies allow creating 
databases that accumulate vast reputational information and provide easy access to any 
interested party at a low cost.  Therefore, even large groups can rely on reputational mechanisms 
to support cooperation.  See Charny, supra note 21, at 419. 
61. See DIXIT, supra note 15, at 67.
62. The reliance on formal dispute resolution and enforcement systems in football may
be the reason of handicapped reputational enforcement of agreements, rather than vice versa.  If 
parties had only reputational mechanisms of enforcement to rely upon, they would have refused 
to deal with actors having a reputation of an opportunist.  Formal institutions, by ensuring the 
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coordinating role.  Indeed, establishing and maintaining such external 
governance structure is costly, but these costs are covered by the benefits 
of organizing behavior in large communities.63  The question then is why 
do the actors involved in football subject themselves to the rules of an 
order designed by a third private party, namely FIFA, instead of complying 
with formal state law?  But before answering this question, we need first 
to understand how FIFA's private order is functioning. 
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD OF FOOTBALL
This section describes the functioning of FIFA's private legal order.  
Weak reputation-based non-legal sanctions in football are compensated by 
stronger formal rules of behavior designed by FIFA.  FIFA's role is to (1) 
design common rules of behavior, (2) record deviations from the common 
rules and impose sanctions on wrongdoers, and (3) create incentives for 
all others to participate in enforcing these sanctions.  Accordingly, we 
proceed in three steps by first describing the rules of behavior, then 
considering the private dispute resolution system, and lastly discussing the 
enforcement mechanisms designed by FIFA. 
A. The Legal Order that FIFA Built: Privately-Designed Rules of
Cooperation 
What sets football in particular and other sports in general apart from 
each other is the rules of the game.  The common rules of football are 
described by FIFA in the Laws of the Game.64  The organization of the 
compliance with contractual obligations, encourage transactions even with actors with bad 
reputations, thereby reducing the reputational consequences of opportunistic behavior.  See 
generally Masten & Prüfer, supra note 60, at 377–78 (using this logic to explain how formal 
legal enforcement may crowd out informal reputational enforcement).  This relationship is two-
sided, as the presence of strong informal networks of cooperation may discourage the 
improvement of functionally equivalent formal legal institutions.  See Avner Greif, Cultural 
Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist 
and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POLIT. ECON. 912, 937 (1994). 
63. See DIXIT, supra note 15, at 74–76 (showing that the size of a community defines the
efficiency of a governance mode: small communities can achieve full self-governance using 
their own information systems; cooperation in large communities fails without external 
governance; intermediate communities fare worst, for they are too large for self-governance but 
too small to afford the costs of external governance). 
64. See FIFA, LAWS OF THE GAME (2015/2016), available at 
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/footballdevelopment/refereeing/02/36/01/11/lawsofthe
gameweben_neutral.pdf 
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game, however, is not limited to a mere unification of the playing rules 
and coordination of the timetables.  Thousands are involved in football—
the most popular game in the majority of the world—as athletes, clubs, 
coaches, managers, club investors, officials, sponsors, and spectators.  
Football (and sports in general) has even been compared to religion.65  
What is more, reportedly, it has more followers than either Christianity or 
Islam.66  The presence of so many interested parties requires common and 
predictable rules of behavior if the game is to be played internationally 
with equal opportunities for everyone.  Only if all participants meet similar 
organizational conditions there is level playing field.  With this purpose in 
mind, FIFA has developed a complex organizational structure that 
practically spans every involved party. 
At the top of the pyramidal network is FIFA with its member 
associations.  The members are national associations each, as a rule, 
representing one independent country.67  They are grouped into six 
confederations representing different geographic regions—CAF in Africa, 
CONCACAF in North and Central America, CONMEBOL in South 
America, OFC in Oceania, AFC in Asia, and UEFA in Europe.68  National 
associations have their own members—licensed football clubs with at 
least one team participating in national competitions.  This structure is 
illustrated in Figure I below. 
Figure I. The Structure of FIFA 
65. See, e.g., JOE HUMPHREYS, FOUL PLAY: WHAT'S WRONG WITH SPORT 6, 8 (2008).
66. Id. at 231.
67. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 10.1 (only one association shall be recognized
in each country).  A special case is the four British associations—the Football Association, the 
Scottish Football Association, The Football Association of Wales, and the Irish Football 
Association (Northern Ireland)—which are separate members of FIFA.  An association from a 
region that has not yet gained independence may apply for FIFA membership with the approval 
of the association in the country on which it is dependent.  See id., art. 10.6.  Currently several 
other football associations which do not represent independent nations are FIFA members—the 
associations of Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, and Kosovo in Europe, Chinese Taipei, Guam, Hong 
Kong, and Macau in Asia, American Samoa, New Caledonia, and Tahiti in Oceania, and some 
American, British, and Dutch overseas territories in the Caribbean. 
68. See id. art. 20.1.
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This structure allows FIFA to influence the game of football at every 
level.  By relying on direct application of its rules to the member national 
associations and everyone participating in the matches and tournaments 
organized by FIFA, as well as indirect effect via its members, FIFA 
stretches its influence to the very bottom of the structure where players, 
coaches, referees, and other individuals—who are neither FIFA members, 
nor the members of national associations—are located. 
The centerpiece of the relations regulated by the rules of FIFA are 
employment-related questions and the participation of clubs in various 
competitions.  With the purpose of protecting its monopoly, FIFA obliges 
the six confederations to ensure that international football tournaments 
with the participation of the clubs from national associations will not be 
organized without the consent of the affected confederation and the 
approval of FIFA.69  This monopoly is crucial in supporting the proper 
69. See id. art. 20.3 (e).
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functioning of FIFA's private order.  Employment matters cover relations 
between the clubs and their primary employees—professional athletes—
and relations among different clubs with regard to soliciting professional 
athletes from each other.  Both employment aspects are regulated by 
FIFA's Transfer Regulations.70 
Organized football is not available to everyone.  In order to be able 
to play in organized football—national tournaments organized by a 
member association or international competitions under the aegis of a 
confederation of which the association is a member—football players 
must be registered with a member association of FIFA.71  The registration, 
which implies that a player agrees to be bound by the rules of FIFA, the 
respective confederations, and national associations, is key in extending 
FIFA's reach to players.72  Since players are formally neither the members 
of FIFA, nor of its member associations, the registration system is needed 
to give players incentives to comply with the rules.  The alternative to 
registration is ostracism—an absolute prohibition to take part in organized 
football.73  And because any more or less significant tournament is 
organized under the auspices of FIFA, the prohibition turns to be 
extremely effective. 
The minimum length of a contract between a club and a professional 
player is from its effective date till the end of the season, while the 
maximum length is five years.74  The length of a football season is defined 
by each national association and normally lasts one year on a fall/spring 
or spring/fall calendar basis.75  The principle of contractual stability forms 
the basis of employment relationships between clubs and professional 
athletes.76  Accordingly, a contract between a professional and a club, apart 
70. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4.
71. See id. art. 5 (1).
72. See infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 18 (2).  Contracts without fixed
terms are thus not allowed. 
75. Id. art. 6 (1) and (2).  Because in most member associations player registration is
allowed at the start and in the middle of the season, the minimum term contracts typically last 
six months.  See infra notes 242–243 and accompanying text.   
76. Note that not all countries qualify professional athletes as employees under domestic
laws.  An overwhelming majority of countries—most EU member states and the US included—
treat professional athletes as employees, albeit sometimes subject to a special legal regime of 
employment.  See Adam Epstein, The ADEA and Sports Law, 16 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 177, 
178 (2006) (discussing the status of athletes in the United States); Michele Colucci, 
Compensation in Case of Breach of Contract: Italy, EUR. SPORTS L. & POL'Y BULL., no. 1, 2011, 
at 199, 202 (explaining that professional athletes in Italy, although qualified as employees, are 
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from the contract term's expiry, may only be terminated (1) by the mutual 
agreement of the parties, (2) by either party based on just cause, or (3) by 
the player who has, in the course of the season, appeared in less than 10% 
of the official matches of his/her club (sporting just cause).77 
Any unilateral termination in breach of the listed grounds leads to 
adverse consequences for the terminating party.  The scope of these 
consequences depends whether the contract is terminated during a so-
called "protected period"—a period of three years after the entry into force 
of a contract signed prior to the 28th birthday of the player or of two years 
if the player is older than 28 at the signing date—or after it.78  If a player 
terminates the contract during the protected period without just cause, 
he/she is, as a rule, banned from playing in official matches for four 
months.79  Similar breach during the protected period by a football club 
results in a restriction to sign new players for two consecutive registration 
periods, which typically are open before (at) the start of a season and 
during its middle break.80  Thus, the sanction lasts approximately one year.  
Both players and clubs are not subject to non-monetary sanctions if a 
exempt from traditional protections prohibiting employee monitoring by cameras, limiting the 
repeated use of fixed-term labor contracts, and ensuring employee reinstatement in cases of 
unilateral dismissal without just cause).  For the sake of simplicity, we disregard special 
treatments offered in some jurisdictions (for example, as a special category of professional 
athletes or even as enterprises) and assume that all professional footballers are employees. 
77. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 13 (termination by mutual agreement),
art. 14 (termination by just cause), art. 15 (termination on the ground of sporting just cause).  
The main instance of just cause from the player's perspective is non-payment or late payment of 
a salary by the club.  From the club's perspective, just cause can be present if a player breaches 
his/her contractual obligations, including failure to report for work.  See FIFA, COMMENTARY 
ON THE REGULATIONS FOR THE STATUS AND TRANSFER OF PLAYERS, art. 14, comment no. 3, 4 
(2007), available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer_commentary
_06_en_1843.pdf [hereinafter FIFA COMMENTARY].  Sporting just cause applies only to 
established professional athletes and can be invoked during a 15-day period following the club's 
last official match in the season. An established player is a player who has completed his/her 
training period and whose level of football skills is at least equal to or even superior to those of 
his/her team-mates who play regularly.  See id. art. 15, comment no. 2. 
78. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 17 (3) and (4).  A protected period starts
again when the duration of an existing contract is extended.  Id., art. 17 (3). 
79. Id. art. 17 (3).  The restriction can be six months if there are aggravating
circumstances, such as repeated breaches.  See also Jean-Philippe Dubey, The Sanctions 
Imposed on the Players for Breach or Unilateral Termination of Contract, CAS BULL., no. 1, 
2010, at 35–36 (explaining the established practice that the decision-making body must apply 
the sanction always aside from exceptional circumstances where the playing ban is not applied 
or its length is reduced). 
80. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 17 (4).
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contract is terminated after the protected period.  However, whether during 
or after the protected period, the terminating party shall always pay 
monetary compensation.81  If not set in the contract, the compensation 
amount due to a player is normally his/her full salary for the remainder of 
the contract.82  The following case illustrates how the compensation is 
calculated if a contract is wrongfully terminated by a player. 
In February 2008, Essam El-Hadary, an Egyptian goalkeeper capped 
more than 100 times by his country's national team, terminated his 
employment contract with Egyptian club Al-Ahli Sporting Club and 
moved to Swiss club Olympique des Alpes SA, known as FC Sion.83  The 
decision to terminate the employment contract unilaterally without just 
cause and to enter into a new contract with FC Sion came after the 
negotiations between the two clubs on the transfer of the player failed.84  
In the absence of a contractual buyout clause in Mr. El-Hadary's contract 
with his former club, the compensation for the unilateral termination had 
to be calculated based on Art. 17 (1) of the Transfer Regulations.85  In 
doing so, the arbiters relied on the so called principle of "positive interest" 
or "expectation interest," which aims to put the injured party in the position 
it would have had if no contractual breach had occurred.86  Accordingly, 
the compensation awarded to the Egyptian club reflected an amount it had 
to spend on a market to find an equivalent replacement for the moving 
player—both in sporting value and the period of remaining contractual 
time.87  The final award thus included the amount that FC Sion was ready 
to pay for the player's transfer ($600,000) plus the player's salary under to 
the new contract for the remaining period of the terminated contract 
($488,500); the player's salary Al-Ahly Sporting Club saved in the result 
of the termination ($292,000) was deducted from the sum.88  The amount 
81. Id. art. 17 (1).
82. See FC Shakhtar Donetsk v. Matuzalem Francelino da Silva & Real Zaragoza SAD
& FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1519 and 2008/A/1520, para. 88 (May 2009) [hereinafter Matuzalem]. 
83. See FC Sion & Essam El-Hadary v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, CAS 2009/A/1880 and 2009/A/1881, paras. 6–18 (Jun. 2010). 
84. Id.
85. Id. para. 198.
86. Id. para. 204.
87. Id. para. 241.
88. Id. paras. 225–26.  Importantly, the third-party decision-maker, when calculating the
amount of compensation, has a wide margin of appreciation and can consider different factors 
that may affect the size of the compensation in each specific case.  For instance, if Al-Ahly 
Sporting Club would have paid a transfer fee for obtaining the services of Mr. El-Hadary, the 
awarded compensation might have also included the non-amortized part of these expenses.  See 
id. paras. 214–15.  On the other hand, if there is no specific evidence on the estimated value of 
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Mr. El-Hadary and FC Sion had to pay ($796,500), which exceeded the 
club's valuation of the player, jointly with the disciplinary sanctions 
imposed on both, deter other actors from breaching or inducing to breach 
existing contracts.89 
The transfers of players between clubs belonging to different 
associations are governed by FIFA's Transfer Regulations.90  National 
associations are responsible for regulating the transfers of players between 
clubs from the same country.91  Nevertheless, FIFA preserves effective 
control over the content of domestic transfer rules by requiring their 
compliance with the Transfer Regulations and submission to FIFA for 
approval.92 
The move of a player between two clubs usually follows one of the 
standard practices.  A player whose contract has expired is free to move to 
any other club of his/her choice.93  Players with acting contracts are bound 
with their current clubs and can move based on two grounds.  First, the 
move can be based on the transfer of the rights of the player's services 
from one club to another.94  Second, clubs can enter into a so called "loan 
contract," pursuant to which one club loans a player to another club for a 
fixed period of time after which the player must return to the loaning 
club.95  Whereas the first ground leads to the termination of the player's 
the player in the market, the decision-maker may use other calculation method.  See Sevilla FC 
SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2145, Morgan de Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., 
CAS 2010/A/2146, Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis & Sevilla FC SAD, CAS 
2010/A/2147, paras. 76–78, 86 (Feb. 2011) (the arbitrators did not include the lost transfer fee 
and the replacement value of the player in the calculation of the compensation). 
89. The player was banned from playing in any official football match for four months,
whereas the club was prohibited from registering new players for two registration periods.  See 
id. paras. 184, 249.  Defining compensation under Art. 17 (1) of the Transfer Regulations 
requires taking into account not only the interests of the involved player and club, but also of 
the whole football community, in particular, the need to promote contractual stability.  See 
Matuzalem, supra note 82, paras. 153–55. 
90. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 1 (1).
91. Id. art. 1 (2).
92. Id.
93. Historically clubs could ask for compensation in exchange for letting a player to move
even if the player's contract had expired.  The European Court of Justice put an end to this 
practice in 1995.  See Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass'n 
(ASBL) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal Club Liégeois v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others, and 
UEFA v. Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-5040 [hereinafter Bosman]. 
94. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 18 (3).
95. Id. art. 10.  Loans often aim to give a promising athlete regular playing time where
there are very few opportunities to play in the main team of his/her club of origin.  If national 
football associations do not allow reserve teams to participate in lower tier tournaments, clubs 
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contract with the current club, in the second case the contract is suspended 
during the entire period that the player is on loan and the new club, based 
on the new contract with the player, is obliged to pay the player's salary.96 
Normally, a club intending to conclude a contract with a 
professional player with a valid employment contract must inform the 
player's current club before starting negotiations with a player.97  After 
reaching a general agreement on the terms and conditions of employment 
with a player, the club starts negotiations with the player's current club.98  
If the two clubs agree on the transfer compensation due to the player's 
current club, the contract between the player and the club is terminated by 
mutual agreement and the player can enter into a contract with the new 
club.99  Contracts of players with clubs may include a so called "release" 
clause which requires the current club to let the player go if another club 
meets the trigger amount specified in the clause.100  In the absence of an 
are effectively forced to loan their young players.  Chelsea F.C. of England and Juventus F.C. 
and A.S. Roma of Italy are notorious examples, each loaning out more than 20 players every 
year, according to TransferMarkt.  A player is expected to be more experienced after returning 
from a loan.  If for the borrowing club this is an opportunity to boost its squad at low cost, the 
lending club, in addition to offering its young talented players regular football, saves on the 
rising cost of wages.  See Gavin Hamilton, Pogba Leads Record Transfer Spending, WORLD 
SOCCER, Oct. 2016, at 25. 
96. See FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 77, art. 10, comment no. 4 (2).
97. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 18 (3).
98. To protect the new club from the risk of missing a player's consent to enter into an
employment contract after the transfer has been agreed between the two clubs, it is a standard 
contracting practice to precondition the performance of the transfer agreement on the consent of 
the player to sign with the new club.  See Real Betis Balompié SAD v. PSV Eindhoven, CAS 
2010/A/2144, para. 85 (Dec. 2010). 
99. See, e.g., Agreement for Transfer of Registration of Mesut Özil between Real Madrid
Club de Fútbol and The Arsenal Football Club PLC, FOOTBALL LEAKS (Sep. 1, 2013), available 
at https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com; Agreement for Transfer of Registration of Luis 
Alberto Suarez Diaz between Futbol Club Barcelona and Liverpool Football Club and Athletic 
Grounds Limited, FOOTBALL LEAKS (Jul. 11, 2014), available at 
https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com; Transfer Agreement between Manchester United 
Football Club Limited and PSV NV, FOOTBALL LEAKS (May 12, 2015), available at 
https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com (concerning the professional football player Memphis 
Depay). 
100. For example, in August 2012, Liverpool F.C., an English club, activated the release 
clause in Joe Allen's contract with Swansea City A.F.C., a Welsh football club that plays in the 
English Premier League.  Liverpool F.C. exploited a technicality in the contract that required 
Swansea City A.F.C. to allow Mr. Allen to join one of the five specified clubs—Liverpool F.C. 
among them—that offered at least £15 million.  See Andy Hunter, Liverpool Near to Closing 
Deal for £15 Million Allen, GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2012.  In early June 2016, Borussia Dortmund 
signed Marc Bartra from FC Barcelona after the player's release clause fell from an initial €40 
million to €8 million because of the limited playing time he received in Barcelona's matches the 
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agreement between clubs or a contractual release clause, unilateral 
termination of a contract by a player without just cause is clearly deemed 
a breach of contract.101  Nevertheless, following this breach, a player may 
start employment with a new club.  Certainly, this scenario entails the 
payment of a compensation to the old club for the loss of the services of 
the player in the result of terminating the existing contract and may also 
trigger non-monetary sanctions.102 
Similar to a release clause, the amount of the compensation for 
unilateral termination of a contract without just cause may be specified by 
the parties in advance.  The parties' agreement has primacy and 
compensation will be defined based on Art. 17 (1) of the Transfer 
Regulations only in the absence of an ex ante agreement about its size.103  
This clause, known as a "buyout clause," should be distinguished from a 
release clause.104  Whereas a buyout clause defines the consequences of a 
unilateral termination of a contract by either of the parties, a release clause 
is conditional upon an offer from a third club and aims to secure a transfer 
compensation.105  Therefore, a buyout clause allows a player to pay the 
specified amount to his/her club and terminate the contract prior to its 
expiry without specifying any reason.106  In legal terms, buyout clauses are 
liquidated damages clauses and may thus be invalid under the domestic 
laws of some countries.107  Formally, the compensation must be paid by 
the terminating player, but the new club, regardless of its involvement or 
previous season.  See Andrew Murray et al., 81 Things We Want from the New Season, 
FOURFOURTWO, Sep. 2016, at 62. 
101. See Frans M. de Weger, Webster, Matuzalem, De Sanctis . . . and the Future, INT'L 
SPORTS L.J., no. 3–4, 2011, at 42, 47. 
102. See supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., RCD Mallorca SAD & A. v. FIFA & UMM Salal SC, CAS 2009/A/1909,
para. 47 (Jan. 2010). 
104. See FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 77, art. 17, comment no. 1 (3).
105. See de Weger, supra note 101, at 44, 56.
106. See FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 77, art. 17, comment no. 1 (3).
107. See FC Pyunik Yerevan v. Carl Lombe, AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, CAS
2007/A/1358, para. 64 (May 2008) [hereinafter FC Pyunik] (qualifying buyout clauses as 
liquidated damages clauses).  In some countries, buyout clauses in employment contracts with 
athletes are allowed by special statutory provisions.  See FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 77, 
art. 17, comment no. 1 (3) (mentioning special regulation in Spain).  Under Spanish law, each 
player has a right to terminate employment contract at will anytime; accordingly, exercising 
such right is not a breach of a contract.  This raises a question about the proper legal qualification 
of the termination compensation: whether it is liquidated damages or some form of 
indemnification for the loss of the services of a player.  See art. 13 (i), art. 16, REAL DECRETO 
1006/1985, de 26 de junio, por el que se regula la relación laboral especial de los deportistas 
profesionales, BOE núm. 153, de 27/06/1985. 
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inducement to terminate, is jointly and severally liable for its payment.108  
Thus, the payment may actually be made by the new club.109  In practice, 
the buyout clause often serves as a starting point in negotiations between 
clubs, rather than a legal ground for the transfer of players. 
Whereas some parties—whether players or clubs—insist on 
including release or buyout clauses in contracts, others prefer to enter into 
contracts without precisely defining such amounts.110  In the latter case, 
the club has wide discretion in negotiations with other clubs over the 
transfer of a player, though this comes at the expense of clarity.  In the 
absence of fixed release fees or compensation amounts, the parties have to 
rely on ex-post negotiations and, if they fail, on litigation.111  However, 
such contracts with intentional gaps reduce the likelihood of transfers of 
players from a club without the club's consent and, more importantly, 
advance knowledge.112  Accordingly, the decision to fix a release fee or a 
108. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 17 (2); FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 
77, art. 17, comment no. 1 (4). 
109. See, e.g., Sevilla FC v. RC Lens, CAS 2010/A/2098, para. 10 (Nov. 2010) (when
Malian football player Seydou Keita unilaterally terminated his employment contract with 
Sevilla Fútbol Club SAD, a Spanish football club, the club received the amount specified in the 
buyout clause from another Spanish club, Fútbol Club Barcelona, through the offices of the 
Spanish National Professional Football League). 
110. E.g., compare Professional Player Employment Contract between Real Madrid Club
de Fútbol and Luka Modric, FOOTBALL LEAKS (Aug. 27, 2012), available at 
https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com (the contract fixed the amount of a compensation for 
unilateral termination at the will of the player at €500 million) with The Standard Premier 
League Playing Contract between Manchester United Football Club Limited and Memphis 
Depay, FOOTBALL LEAKS (Jun. 10, 2015), available at https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com 
(the contract required calculating the amount of the compensation in the case of terminating the 
contract by the player without just cause based on the player's true transfer market value as at 
the date of the termination). 
111. See, e.g., Shakhtar Donetsk v. Ilson Pereira Dias Junior, CAS 2010/O/2132 (Sep.
2011); Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2145, Morgan de Sanctis v. 
Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146, Udinese Calcio S.p.A. v. Morgan de Sanctis & 
Sevilla FC SAD, CAS 2010/A/2147 (Feb. 2011); FC Sion & Essam El-Hadary v. Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Al-Ahly Sporting Club, CAS 2009/A/1880 and 
2009/A/1881 (Jun. 2010). 
112. In April 2013, about one month before the UEFA Champions League final between
Borussia Dortmund and FC Bayern München, two German clubs, the news about the transfer of 
Borussia Dortmund's star player Mario Götze to their bitter rivals in Munich at the end of the 
season shocked the players, managers, and all fans of the club.  FC Bayern München, after 
negotiating general terms of employment with Götze, triggered the €37 million ($48 million) 
release clause included in the player's four-year contract with Borussia Dortmund signed the 
previous summer.  This move, which came as a surprise in Dortmund, worsened the relations of 
the two clubs ahead of the final.  See Marcus Christenson, Götze Transfer Adds Hostility to the 
Mix: Respect between Clubs Disappeared After the Move was Announced, OBSERVER, May 19, 
THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER OF FIFA 
26 
compensation amount ex ante or leave the matter open and rely on ex post 
negotiations (or litigation) is a trade-off between incurring costs at the two 
different stages.113  This trade-off obviously affects the choice of the 
contracting parties.  Where a player has a large growth potential and the 
parties are uncertain about the limits of such growth, or the player is 
crucial for the club, leaving gaps in a contract may better serve the club's 
interests.  Its presence in or absence from the contract, and the size, then 
reflect the strength of the bargaining power of the parties. 
B. FIFA's Private Dispute Resolution System
The success of the private legal order built by FIFA relies on the 
effectiveness of its dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms.  
Private adjudication provides information and expertise advantages over 
adjudication in formal state courts.114  In addition, FIFA has at its disposal 
dire punishment mechanisms for actors that violate its rules, ranging from 
fines and temporary restrictions of rights up to ostracism.115  The results 
of adjudication are buttressed up by an effective enforcement system: if 
the rules cannot be enforced against their infringers or they can be 
challenged in public courts, the whole system of rules will be shattered. 
Disputes within FIFA are resolved by the internal judicial bodies of 
FIFA.  These are the Disciplinary Committee, which is responsible for 
imposing sanctions according to the FIFA Disciplinary Code, the Ethics 
Committee, which may pronounce sanctions provided by the FIFA Ethics 
Code, and the Appeal Committee, which hears appeals from the two other 
2013; Joshua Robinson, Dortmund Dismayed by Transfer; Supporters In Shock as Rival Bayern 
Munich Poaches Star Player Mario Götze, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 23, 2013. The club has 
avoided including release or buyout clauses in contracts with players since then.  See Borussia 
Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA, Ad Hoc Announcement: Transfer Rumours about Mats Julian 
Hummels (Apr. 28, 2016), available at http://aktie.bvb.de/eng/IR-News/Ad-Hoc-
News/Transfer-rumours-about-Mats-Julian-Hummels (stating that Borussia Dortmund has not 
agreed on an "exit clause" with any of its current players). 
113. See generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (840–44) (2006) (the parties engage in an efficiency-based 
choice between rules and standards at the contracting stage; where ex ante transaction costs are 
lower than ex post enforcement costs, the parties prefer to negotiate and draft clear rules instead 
of relying on abstract standards that depend heavily on the enforcement by a third-party 
adjudicator). 
114. See infra notes 291–293 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
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judicial bodies.116  These judicial bodies resolve disputes based on the 
FIFA regulations or, in the absence of relevant rules, first, in accordance 
with the FIFA's customs and second, pursuant to the rules they would lay 
down if they were acting as legislators.117  Disputes arising from 
international transfers of players are considered by another internal 
body—the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the FIFA Players' Status 
Committee.118 
In addition to the internal mechanisms of dispute resolution, FIFA 
recognizes the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) to decide on disputes between FIFA, its members, confederations, 
leagues, clubs, players, intermediaries, and other involved parties.119  
CAS, founded in 1984 and headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, is an 
international arbitration court for resolving sport-related disputes and is 
independent from FIFA.120  FIFA's members and six confederations have 
not only agreed to be bound by the decisions of CAS, but are obliged by 
the FIFA membership rules to create mechanisms that will ensure 
compliance with these decisions by their member clubs and affiliated 
athletes and coaches.121 
FIFA recognized CAS as a final appeal jurisdiction in 2002 and this 
has brought a dramatic increase in the caseload of the court.122  The court's 
352 arbitrators, of which only 93 are eligible to consider football-related 
disputes, received a record 503 filings in 2015, compared with less than 
100 complaints filed annually during the 1990s.123  In practice, most cases 
are considered by a panel of three arbiters, though there are also cases 
116. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, arts. 62 (Disciplinary Committee), 63 (Ethics
Committee), and 64 (Appeal Committee). 
117. See DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 144.
118. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 54.2; TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note
4, art. 24 (1). 
119. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 66.
120. See Louise Reilly, An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and
the Role of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 63, 63–64 
(2012); Richard H. McLaren, Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Look 
in the Rear-View Mirror, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 305, 306, 309 (2010). 
121. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 68.1.
122. See McLaren, supra note 120, at 315.  This recognition, given the growing interest of
public bodies to intervene in sports, was driven by the strategy to keep formal courts and public 
law away from football.  See Antoine Duval, The Court of Arbitration for Sport And EU Law: 
Chronicle of an Encounter, 22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 224, 225–26 (2015). 
123. General information about CAS, including statistics on filed cases and the list of
arbitrators, is available on the court's website at http://www.tas-cas.org/en/index.html. 
THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER OF FIFA 
28 
decided by one arbiter.124  Currently, football-related disputes account for 
about 30–40% of all cases considered by CAS.125  Most are appeals from 
the decisions of the internal judicial bodies of FIFA.126  As a rule, the cases 
involve contractual disputes between clubs, clubs and players, or 
intermediaries and clubs; indeed, there are also disciplinary cases.127  CAS 
resolves all these disputes by applying primarily the various regulations of 
FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.128 
Internal judicial bodies and the recognition of CAS as an 
independent appeal instance, which rules primarily using the rules of 
FIFA, form the system that aims to resolve disputes without external 
influence.129  This system is further backed by a waiver of any right to take 
recourse to ordinary courts of law.130  FIFA takes significant efforts to 
prevent external intervention into its legal order.  An actor that 
successfully takes a dispute to formal state courts not only imposes costs 
on its counterparty by escaping from its obligations, but also creates a 
negative externality for all other actors, for any such intervention reduces 
the clarity of the established rules of behavior.  First, the new interpretation 
of the challenged rule changes the case law of the internal dispute 
resolution bodies and might require a long period to develop new concepts 
for compliance.  Second, any successful challenge provides other actors 
that lose their arguments in the internal dispute resolution venues with 
stronger incentives to seek for justice elsewhere. 
C. The Ties that Bind: The System of Sanctions and Incentives Promoting
Compliance with the Decisions of the Private Dispute Resolution Bodies
124. Original Research (on file with the authors).
125. See McLaren, supra note 120, at 315.
126. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 64.2 (recourse may only be made to CAS after
all other internal channels have been exhausted). 
127. See Ulrich Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes: The Relationship
between the CAS Code, the FIFA Statutes and the Agreement of the Parties on the Application 
of National Law, CAS BULL., no. 2, 2015, at 7. 
128. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 66.2.  The role of Swiss law is to assist in
interpreting the rules of FIFA.  See Haas, supra note 127, at 15–16. 
129. See Kate Youd, The Winter's Tale of Corruption: The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar,
the Impending Shift to Winter, and Potential Legal Actions against FIFA, 35 NW. J. INT'L L. & 
BUS. 167, 181 (2014). 
130. See infra Part IV.B (describing the obligation to refrain taking disputes outside the
system mandated by FIFA and mechanisms for enforcing this obligation). 
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FIFA not only has its own dispute resolution system, but also has 
developed effective enforcement mechanisms relying on sanctions and, to 
a lesser extent, reputation and social ties.  Without such mechanisms the 
value added of the private legal order would be shattered, for any actor 
dissatisfied with the decision entered against it could easily challenge it 
elsewhere by asking for the application of relevant state-made laws.131 
Therefore, one of the main concerns of FIFA is to ensure the compliance 
of its members and all football-related non-members—like players, clubs, 
and coaches—with its privately-designed rules.132  And FIFA has put in a 
great deal of effort to achieve this objective. 
The sanction system includes fines, temporary bans, or ostracism.  
They may be applied directly to member associations which, under the 
threat of sanctions, are obliged to comply with the regulations and 
decisions of FIFA, as well as with the decisions of CAS.133  Clubs, players, 
and other involved actors may be subject to direct sanctions as well, but in 
many instances FIFA reaches them indirectly through the affiliated 
member association.  It is the obligation of member associations to ensure 
that their own members—that is football clubs—and affiliated players and 
coaches, comply with all applicable rules and decisions.134  Accordingly, 
FIFA uses three means for extending its reach to non-members.  First, 
FIFA can apply its regulations directly to everyone participating in 
matches and competitions organized by FIFA, like the FIFA World Cup.135  
Second, member associations are charged with applying FIFA regulations 
directly to all affected parties within their responsibility territories.136  And 
third, member associations are under obligation to transpose FIFA 
regulations into national regulations.137  In the last case, FIFA regulations 
draw the minimum line and member associations are free to establish 
stricter rules. 
Possible sanctions vary but they are leveraged by the monopoly 
power of FIFA.  Consider the right of FIFA to suspend a member 
association for a specific period or expel it fully from FIFA for failure to 
131. See infra Part IV.A (describing challenges to FIFA's legal order from state law).
132. FIFA's other main concern is the protection of its private legal order from outside
challenges.  See infra Part IV.B (exploring the interests and incentives of different actors to 
challenge the private legal order of FIFA). 
133. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 13.1 (a).
134. See id. arts. 13.1 (d), 68.1.
135. See DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 2.
136. See, e.g., DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 70.1.
137. See, e.g., LICENSING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 1.
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comply with its obligations, including an obligation to comply with FIFA 
or CAS decisions.138  In such cases, other members may not entertain 
sporting contacts with a suspended or expelled member.139  Given FIFA's 
monopoly, this, in fact, means that national teams and licensed clubs from 
the suspended or expelled country cannot participate in any organized 
game with national teams or clubs from other associations. 
Similar actions by clubs may result in fines, deduction of points, 
relegation to a lower competition division, or a transfer ban, which 
prevents a club from registering new players during a specific period.140  
Via its power over the member associations, FIFA can require 
enforcement of these sanctions even for matches and competitions not 
organized by it.141  In the absence of alternative equivalent competitions 
organized outside FIFA's reach, clubs have strong incentives to comply or 
face the negative consequences.  The most effective compliance-
encouraging instrument, though, is the regular, typically on an annual 
basis, obligation of clubs to go through a licensing procedure as a 
condition to participate in international and, as a rule, top-division national 
competitions.142  Particularly, the recognition by the applicant of the 
binding effect of the FIFA's private legal order and a promise to keep 
disputes within the "football family" by refraining from filing petitions and 
complaints with ordinary courts is an essential mandatory licensing 
condition.143 
An equivalent effect for players, coaches, and other individuals is 
reached by imposing a possible ban on any football-related activity.144  
This punishment is credible only if other members of the community, 
clubs in our context, are willing to participate in its enforcement by 
138. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, arts. 14 and 15; DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note
4, art. 64.1 (d).
139. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 14.3.
140. See DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 64.1 (c).
141. See id. art. 70.1.
142. See LICENSING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 2.2.9.1 (national associations must
decide to which clubs the licensing requirement applies; as a minimum, the requirement is 
applicable to top-division clubs which qualify for confederation club competitions on sporting 
merit, but it is best practice to implement the club licensing system for all top-division clubs of 
the national association).  In strict legal terms, a license is granted to a legal entity responsible 
for a football team participating in national and international competitions.  See id., art 4.3.1.1. 
143. See id. art. 9.2.1 (L.01).
144. See DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 64.4.
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refusing to deal with the infringer.145  FIFA achieves this by making 
participation in collective punishment part of the equilibrium: clubs 
themselves are liable for registering "outlawed" players.146  Since all 
players involved with a club shall be registered with member associations, 
deviations from participating in collective punishments are both easily 
observable and verifiable.  At the same time, club participation in 
organized national and international tournaments is conditioned upon the 
affiliation of a club with one of the membership associations.147  In the 
absence of alternative tournaments and leagues not affiliated with FIFA 
that can generate significant financial rewards, clubs have strong 
incentives to comply with the established rules, including the obligation to 
enforce the decisions of FIFA and its dispute resolution bodies.  
Accordingly, if a player is banned temporarily from playing football, 
hardly any club will risk to employ him/her.  This allows the system to 
work effectively in practice. 
In brief, a wish to play or coach football professionally requires 
players and coaches to comply with the multi-layer regulations governing 
the organization of the game; an intention by clubs to participate in 
national and international matches and competitions forces them to 
comply with the rules and decisions of FIFA and a respective 
confederation or a national association; finally, membership in FIFA—or 
in other words, access for the national team and local clubs to the world of 
football—calls for agreeing to all obligations imposed by FIFA.  In the 
absence of alternatives, these are inevitable decisions.  The lack of 
alternatives explains why every involved party commits to be bound by 
the rules of the game in the first place and sticks to this commitment 
subsequently. 
Reputation or unwritten norms of behavior play a certain role as 
well, although this role is much limited compared to other instances of 
145. See DIXIT, supra note 28, at 63–64; Avinash Dixit, Governance Institutions and
Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, 9, 12–13 (2009) (noting that collective action 
problems of punishment can be solved by stipulating equilibrium strategies where taking 
punishment actions is part of compliance with the rules of the game).  See also Greif et al., supra 
note 7, at 757–58 (documenting various strategies used by medieval merchant guilds for
sustaining credibility of their sanctions, including by imposing fines or commercial sanctions on 
their non-complying member merchants; for instance, the rules of behavior of the 13th century 
Flemish cloth merchants imposed secondary punishments on those who failed to comply with 
injunctions not to deal with merchants who cheated Flemish merchants). 
146. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 11.
147. See supra Figure I.
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promoting cooperation by the private means of governance.148  First, clubs 
deal with each other regularly in national and international transfer 
markets where they sign players from each other.  Strained relationships 
between two clubs based on their prior dealings can be the reason of 
rejecting any friendly contacts in the future.149  A hostile move by one 
party can spark retaliation by another.150  In addition, it is not uncommon 
when strong rivalries between the clubs put additional pressure on players 
who move to the camp of the "enemy."151  This might suffice to support 
bilateral cooperation without external intervention, but cannot satisfy the 
conditions for successful multilateral cooperation.152  Indeed, given the 
extremely large number of the involved actors, as well as geographical 
lines of demarcation among member association/confederations, 
reputation alone is not enough to support cooperation by creating 
conditions for collective punishment of wrongdoers.  For example, a 
148. E.g., compare the following discussion with Barnett, supra note 30, at 646 (explaining
the role of reputational capital in contracts with established Hollywood stars) and Bernstein, 
supra note 30, at 592–96, 604–07 (showing how relational ties substitute or complement 
procurement contracts of large original equipment manufacturers). 
149. Recall the case of Mario Götze discussed earlier.  See supra note 112.  Trust between
the two clubs has improved in the summer of 2016, when they completed the transfers of three 
players, including the return of Mario Götze to Dortmund, based on mutually negotiated 
agreements.  See Ballspielverein Borussia 09 e.V. Dortmund, Personnel Matters: Borussia 
Dortmund Re-Sign Mario Götze (Jul. 21, 2016), available at 
http://www.bvb.de/eng/News/Overview/Borussia-Dortmund-re-sign-Mario-Goetze (quoting 
Hans-Joachim Watzke, the CEO of Borussia Dortmund, thanking the Chairman of the FC 
Bayern Munich Board of Directors, Karl-Heinz Rummenigge: "We have negotiated three 
transfers with Bayern this summer.  All of our negotiations have been characterised by great 
seriousness and mutual trust."). 
150. Information about the existence of a gentlemen's agreement among a group of about
200 European clubs not to employ players who had terminated their contracts unilaterally, which 
was denied by the European Club Association, surfaced in 2013.  See FIFPro, Article 17: 
Rummenigge Furious, FIFPro Reacts (Dec. 13, 2013), available at 
https://fifpro.org/en/news/article-17-rummenigge-furious-fifpro-reacts. 
151. One of the most controversial transfers in the history of football was the decision of
Luis Figo, the once Portugal captain, to swap FC Barcelona for their long-standing rivals CF 
Real Madrid in the summer of 2000.  FC Barcelona's supporters felt so betrayed and angry that 
a pig's head and coins were thrown at him when he returned with Madrid to the Nou Camp for 
the Spanish La Liga game between the two clubs.  See Sarah Edworthy, 8 Footballers Who Have 
Sparked Fans' Furry by Leaving in Acrimony, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 19, 2005, at 06; 
Loyalty's for Mugs? The Men Who Crossed the Great Divide, DAILY MIRROR, May 27, 2004, at 
79. 
152. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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player rejected in one country (or region) can find employment in 
another.153 
Second, reputational mechanisms are further strengthened by the 
involvement of specialized intermediaries between the clubs and players.  
Previously known as agents, these intermediaries perform two tasks: they 
negotiate better terms for their clients and close information gaps between 
players and clubs.154  While the first task is clear, the second needs further 
explanation.  Each intermediary typically has a pool of players and is well 
aware of their abilities.  Accordingly, an intermediary can offer the 
services of its clients to clubs that are in specific needs.155  For example, 
one club may look for a midfield player with an ability to support 
teammates in an intensive high-pressing game, whereas another may need 
a midfielder that can exploit open spaces and find teammates to pass the 
ball.  Top clubs often bring this task "in-house" by employing special data 
analysts and scouts who study player performance stats and attend (youth) 
tournaments worldwide to select talented players for their employers.156  
The latter has arguably reduced the role of intermediaries.157 
153. Clubs from leagues in North American, East Asian, and Middle East countries, which
are not yet competing with top European leagues in terms of either sporting or financial power, 
can use such situations as an opportunity to snap talented players who are otherwise reluctant to 
play in these leagues. 
154. The role of some intermediaries is much more than that.  They may have a key 
influence on the player's football career, particularly by motivating and directing them at young 
age.  For instance, Mino Raiola, one of the most influential intermediaries in modern football, 
offers personal service to each of his clients, varying from dealing with daily routines to 
managing their funds: the former may include a call from a player asking a shopping advice; at 
the other extreme, Mr. Raiola reportedly manages a whopping €900 million investment portfolio 
in the interests of his clients.  See Simon Kuper, The Dealmaker, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2016.  We received similar information about the role of highly-regarded intermediaries during 
an interview with an ex-legal counsel at a FIFA member association (Sep. 6, 2016). 
155. A similar argument has been advanced by Professor Bernstein in other contexts.  See
Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 10, at 133 (arguing that brokers reduce transaction 
costs in the diamond trade because they can obtain relevant information at lower cost than 
individual buyers and sellers; the chief reason is that the information obtained by brokers is less 
transaction specific and can be offered to many interested parties); Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon 
Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineers?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 246–47 (1995) (depicting 
a similar role for lawyers in Silicon Valley). 
156. See, e.g., Jack Gaughan, Manchester United Appoint 50 New Scouts in Double-Quick
Time as Premier League Giants Scour Globe for the Next Generation of Young Talent, DAILY 
MAIL, Oct. 13, 2016 (describing the rise of football scouts and the importance of identifying 
talent in ensuring sustainable sporting success); Adam Isaacs, Analytics Level Playing Field in 
Identifying Football Talent, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 1, 2014. 
157. See Simon Kuper, Clout of Football Managers Relegated by Data and the Total
Squad Wage Bill, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 13, 2016, at 3 ("Whereas managers used to make new 
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Many of these intermediaries are repeat players and thus have strong 
incentives to protect their reputational capital that they have developed in 
a close-knit industry of top clubs and football academies.  As a result, they 
mostly act according to the established norms of behavior.  But the world 
of intermediaries is big and outside the small group of top agents self-
governance is pushed to the margins. 
Lastly, clubs and other actors put peer-pressure on each other to 
comply with the decisions of FIFA's dispute resolution bodies.  There are 
two reasons for this.  First, the clubs that had been punished and complied 
with the imposed sanctions previously, are interested for others to comply 
as well, because non-compliance by others will impair the level playing 
field by putting complying actors in a disadvantaged position.  Second, 
and more importantly, FIFA has developed sanctions that punish the entire 
collective if one of the actors fails to comply with the ruling entered 
against it.  Accordingly, everyone in the collective is strongly interested in 
ensuring compliance by the wrongdoer.158  The case of FC Sion is 
illustrative. 
As described earlier, El-Hadary ruling imposed a one-year ban on 
Swiss club FC Sion to sign new players.159  Notwithstanding this, FC Sion 
signed six new players and, after securing the order of a local court that 
the new players were eligible to play, fielded them against Celtic FC, 
Scottish club, in a qualifying match of the Europa League in August 2011.  
Although the Swiss club was the winner of the pair, UEFA disqualified 
the club from the competition for a clear breach of a transfer ban imposed 
on it; FC Sion's place in the tournament was handed to the Scotts.  FC Sion 
brought the dispute to Swiss courts and obtained an interim measure—
later ignored by UEFA—ordering the reinstatement of the club in the 
Europa League.160  In December 2011, FIFA stepped up the dispute 
threatening to suspend the Swiss Football Association—and therefore its 
member clubs—should the authorities fail to impose sanctions on FC Sion 
signings based on intuition, tips from friendly agents and chance past experiences of a player, 
now transfers are increasingly informed by data."). 
158. See generally GREIF, supra note 36, at 310–11 (explaining the incentives structure of
the medieval community responsibility system). 
159. See supra note 89.
160. FC Sion and several of its players also complained to the European Commission and
the Swiss competition authority about the behavior of UEFA.  They argued that UEFA's 
rejection to reinstate the club in the Europa League was an abuse of a dominant position. 
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for using ineligible players.161  This put additional peer-pressure on the 
management of FC Sion.162 
To conclude, this is an example of an effective complex 
enforcement system that is not backed by the coercive power of any state.  
FIFA acts as a coercive power itself; in addition, incentive mechanisms 
complement the sanctions.163 
IV. THE PARALLEL WORLD OF PUBLIC LAW AND THE MECHANISMS OF
LOCKING IN FIFA'S PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER 
Following the explanation of FIFA's private legal order above, this 
part describes the challenges to the order from public law.  Subsequently, 
the analysis moves to the mechanisms used by FIFA to promote the 
exclusive reliance of actors on its private order. 
A. Challenges to the Private Legal Order from Public Law
1. Employment Laws and FIFA's Transfer Regulations
FIFA's Transfer Regulations, which set "global and binding rules 
concerning the status of players, their eligibility to participate in organized 
football, and their transfer between clubs belonging to different 
associations,"164 create strong tensions between FIFA's regulatory 
autonomy and the sovereign jurisdictions of its member associations (and 
supra-national organizations, such as the EU).  Apart from the Transfer 
Regulations and the corresponding rules adopted by the continental 
confederations and national football associations, clubs and their players 
161. This narrative is based on official documents and news articles compiled by History
Commons.  See Football Business and Politics: FC Sion Affair, HISTORY COMMONS, available 
at 
http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=ftbl_bus_pol_tmln&ftbl_bus_pol_tmln
_specific_issues=ftbl_bus_pol_tmln_fc_sion_affair. 
162. See Graham Dunbar, FIFA Threat to Suspend Switzerland over Sion Case
Jeopardizes Basel Place in Champions League, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES (Dec. 17, 
2011) (describing the efforts of the vice president of a rival Swiss club, FC Basel, in securing 
the support of other European clubs to end the resistance by the management of FC Sion). 
163. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 235, 247 (1979) (showing that unless ostracism or reputation-related private 
remedy is available because the dispute is between members of a close-knit community, a public 
remedy will often be necessary to induce parties to submit the dispute to arbitration and comply 
with the arbitrator's award). 
164. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 1.1.
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also have to adhere to (supra-)national labor laws.165  This system of 
overlapping, and sometimes contradicting, rules has its origins in the 
historical practice of national and international legislatures of refraining 
from regulating the area of sports, thereby leaving the ordering of the 
matter to the sporting associations themselves.166  Figure II below 
illustrates the relationships between the different levels of public and 
private ordering. 
Figure II. The Relationship of Labor Rules in Football 
Tensions between different levels of employment rules are 
especially visible in matters such as equality and/or non-discrimination of 
workers, the treatment and qualification of minors, the freedom to choose 
employment, and the freedom of movement.  Each is described briefly 
below. 
Employee Discrimination.  Rules restricting the number of foreign 
players a football club is allowed to register as well as their eligibility to 
165. Although not all countries qualify professional athletes as employees under domestic
laws, we assume that all professional footballers are employees.  See supra note 76. 
166. See Steven F.H. Jellinghaus, Een introductie tot sport en recht, ARBEID INTEGRAAL,
no. 3, 2003, at 70.  See also MARCO MOSSELMAN, INLEIDING SPORT EN RECHT (2012); HEIKO 
VAN STAVEREN, SPORT EN RECHT (2007). 
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play are commonplace among national associations.  Numerous national 
football associations—such as that of China, Russia, and the United 
States—have quotas in place today,167 whereas some national associations 
within the EU maintain a quota that makes a distinction between EU and 
non-EU nationals.168  This limit has led to several lawsuits filed with the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or CAS.169  The EU and the ECJ rebuked 
football governing bodies on the matter of treating players from all EU 
member states as "domestic" and non-EU players as "foreign," yet the 
problem remains unsolved in countries like Italy and Spain.170  On the 
contrary, there is, instead, a movement in the opposite direction—national 
football associations that do not have quotas in place currently opt for their 
introduction in the future, as planned by the English Football Association 
and declared by its chairman Greg Dyke, for example.171  In no field other 
than football restrictive quotas are imposed for employees, for they would 
be a blatant discrimination.172  This is indeed a fair point that the ECJ has 
refuted nonetheless.173 
167. In China, each club can have only five foreign players, of which four can play at any
one time.  See John Duerden, China: The Great Leap Forward, WORLD SOCCER, Mar. 2016, at 
26. The clubs of the Russian Premier League are not allowed to field more than six players that
are not eligible to play in the Russian national team.  See RUSSIAN FOOTBALL UNION,
REGULATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FOOTBALL CHAMPIONSHIP AMONG THE TEAMS OF THE CLUBS
OF THE PREMIER LEAGUE, 2016–2017, art. 5.10, available at http://rfpl.org/rfpl/documents/ (in
Russian).  The rules of Major League Soccer, men's professional soccer league in the United
States and Canada, allocate 160 international roster spots among the 20 clubs.  Each club was
given eight international roster spots in 2008.  Since there is no limit on the number of
international players on each club's roster and the spots can be traded, currently some clubs have
more than eight international players.  The total number of international players in the league,
however, cannot exceed the maximum limit.  See MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, 2016 MLS ROSTER
RULES AND REGULATIONS, art. II, available at http://pressbox.mlssoccer.com/content/roster-
rules-and-regulations.
168. See Rules for Non-EU players, GOLDEN GOALS, available at http://www.golden-
goals.com/content/rules-for-non-eu-players. 
169. See, e.g., Case C-152/08, Real Sociedad de Fútbol SAD and Nihat Kahveci v. Consejo
Superior Deportes and Real Federacion Espanola de Fútbol, 2008 E.C.R.; Racing Club 
Asociación Civil v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3536 (May 2015).  See also Zeynap Ilay Gümrük, The 
European Court of Justice's Ruling in the Kahveci Case Lights the Way for Other Turkish 
National Sportsmen in the European Union, ANKARA BAR REV., no. 2, 2009, at 102, 111–12. 
170. See supra note 168.
171. See Ben Smith, FA's Greg Dyke Announces Plans to Restrict Non-EU Players, BBC 
(Mar. 23, 2015), available at http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/32024808. 
172. See H.W.P. van den Hout, 6+5=11: Nationaliteitsclausules na het Bosman-arrest, 
ARBEIDSRECHT, no. 3, 2009, at 13, 13–14. 
173. See Joseph Maguire & Robert Pearton, The Impact of Elite Labour Migration on the
Identification, Selection and Development of European Soccer Players, 18 J. SPORTS SCI. 759, 
761 (2000). 
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Freedom to Choose Employment.  Football players are strictly 
bound to their employment contracts and have limited means to terminate 
employment during the contract's term.174  This is a unique situation, as 
other employees typically are free to seek and solicit for new employment.  
The inability of players to terminate their contracts without cause, before 
expiry and without paying compensation, is in stark contrast with 
traditional employment law, according to which employees are free to end 
employment without cause by prior notice.  The special treatment of 
football players comes close to forced or compulsory labor.175  As 
explained above, early termination of employment contract by a player 
without just cause always leads to the payment of a compensation to the 
player's club and may also result in a temporary ban from playing.176 
Freedom of Movement.  The freedom of movement for workers has 
come up implicitly throughout the discussion of the previous two 
problems.  It has to be mentioned—perhaps even redundantly so—that this 
is a specific problem regarding the EU.177  The groundbreaking case here 
is, of course, the Bosman ruling of the ECJ.178  Prior to this decision, 
football players were tied to their clubs indefinitely and could move 
between clubs only after the payment of a compensation.  When the 
employment contract of Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian player, with his 
club Royal Club Liègeoise SA expired, he intended to move to USL 
Dunkerque, French football club.  The latter, however, was not willing to 
pay the transfer fee and, as a result, the Belgian football authorities did not 
transfer the player's certificate, rendering Mr. Bosman ineligible for 
playing in France.  Mr. Bosman took the matter to court and the ECJ 
declared the rule incompatible with the freedom of movement for workers 
and competition law.179  This decision shook up the entire football world 
174. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
175. More than three decades ago the European Commission of Human Rights, the
predecessor of the European Court of Human Rights, refused to qualify pre-Bosman transfer 
rules as leading to forced labor.  See X. v. Netherlands, App. No. 9322/81, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 180, 183 (1983) (explaining the applicant voluntarily chose to become a 
professional football player knowing that he would be affected by the transfer rules). 
176. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
177. The freedom of movement for workers is one of the four economic freedoms within
the EU.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 
45, May 9, 2008, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 65–66 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
178. See Bosman, supra note 93.
179. See id.
THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER OF FIFA 
39 
at the time, leading to the reshaping of transfer rules into the order we 
know today.180 
The concept of contractual stability has been introduced into player 
transfer rules to replace the pre-Bosman system of transfer fees.181  
Accordingly, transfer fees due after the expiry of a contract have been 
substituted with a compensation due for the unilateral termination of a 
valid contract without just cause.  The new system, which is a product of 
negotiations between the European Commission, FIFA, UEFA, and 
FIFPro, a global organization representing the interests of professional 
football players, aims to promote contractual stability between players and 
clubs while respecting each player's right to free movement.182  
Nevertheless, the prevailing interpretation of art. 17 of the Transfer 
Regulations by FIFA's internal dispute resolution bodies and by the CAS 
strongly favors contractual stability over free movement.183  It is fair to 
acknowledge that even the involvement of the EU has not been a game 
changer in bringing football's special legal order under the requirements 
of formal state laws. 
2. Competition Laws and the Monopoly of FIFA
Anti-competitive activities, due to potential implications for free 
trade and the common market, are a main feature of the European Union's 
work, and in particular of the European Commission.184  The powers of 
the Commission are based on articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.185  The 
way FIFA can run afoul of both of these clauses is extensively discussed 
in literature, so we merely present a brief overview.186 
180. See Steven F.H. Jellinghaus, Het opleidings- en solidariteitssyteem van de FIFA: de
stand van zaken, ARBEIDSRECHTERLIJKE ANNOTATIES, no. 2, 2005, at 4, 27–31. 
181. See Matuzalem, supra note 82, para. 79.
182. See Paul A. Czarnota, FIFA Transfer Rules and Unilateral Termination without "Just
Cause", 2 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 3–5, 7 (2013). 
183. See id. at 37–38.
184. See DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES, & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 943 (2014). 
185. See TFEU, supra note 177, at 88–89.  Article 101 deals with distortion of the market
by agreements between competitors, such as price-fixing; article 102 covers abuse of a dominant 
position in a specific market. 
186. See, e.g., RICHARD PARRISH, SPORTS LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
109–59 (2003); Ben Van Rompuy, The Role of EU Competition Law in Tackling Abuse of 
Regulatory Power by Sports Associations, 22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 179, 198–206 
(2015). 
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FIFA has a near monopoly in organizing official football 
tournaments.187  Relying on its regulatory rights, FIFA can restrict access 
to the market, thereby entrenching its market power.188  Whether by 
refusing to authorize any event organized by potential competitors or, 
alternatively, by prohibiting the participation of its members, and as a 
consequence of football clubs and players, in competitor-organized events, 
FIFA can effectively establish barriers for competition.189  Though not 
challenged directly, competition authorities and courts in Europe 
considered several cases that can be easily extended to FIFA.190  Other 
potential competition law challenges to FIFA concern its rules on third 
party ownership191 and player transfers.192  These and similar potential 
actions taken against FIFA under both articles of the TFEU may void and 
imperil many of FIFA's actions.193 An additional problem is the European 
Commission's insistence on pursuing its competition policy through 
national courts, which is discussed next. 
3. Access to Justice and the Prohibition to File Complaints in Public
Courts
FIFA's compliance with the fundamental freedoms and anti-
competition law is not subject to challenges solely from the EU bodies, 
either acting on their own or on a request; national courts also have a duty 
to uphold these rules.  It is thus not strange that FIFA has been "fiercely 
territorial" when it comes to allowing athletes to bring cases to national 
187. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
188. See Van Rompuy, supra note 186, at 199.
189. See id.
190. Two cases, one at the EU level and one national, considered the power of sport
associations to block the organization of sport events by competing bodies.  In FIA/Formula 
One, the European Commission considered whether the Fédération Internationale de 
l'Automobile (or FIA), the governing body for motor sport, used its power to block the 
organization of races that competed with its own events.  In Gargano Corse/ACI, the Italian 
national competition authority questioned whether the regulations of the domestic motor sport 
association intended to restrict competition by prohibiting the arrangement of motor sport events 
by private organizers.  Three other national cases (one from Ireland and two from Sweden) 
focused on the right of sport associations to effectively restrict competition by discouraging 
athletes from competing in events run by other organizations.  See Van Rompuy, supra note 
186, at 200–06 (describing all five cases). 
191. See W. Tyler Hall, Comment, After the Ban: The Financial Landscape of
International Soccer after Third-Party Ownership, 94 Or. L. Rev. 179, 202–15 (2015). 
192. See Richard Parrish, Article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players: Compatibility with EU Law, 22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 256, 267–75 (2015). 
193. See Van Rompuy, supra note 186, at 207.
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courts,194 and actually prohibits this in its statutes; member associations, 
in turn, have to prevent their members from going to the courts.195  Clauses 
prohibiting access to courts are void in many legal systems,196 but football 
players would have them struck down at their peril, for bringing a case to 
court is accompanied by heavy internal sanctions for the member allowing 
it and negative consequences for the athlete's personal career.197 
Nevertheless, there are a few potential problems for FIFA and other 
sports organizations with respect to keeping their disputes away from 
external judicial scrutiny.  First of all, there is always the possibility that a 
player will ignore all the obstacles and will bring a dispute to a state court 
anyway.198  Secondly, standard clauses on accepting the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CAS are controversial given the question as to whether 
their acceptance is voluntary.199  Indeed, in an ongoing dispute in 
Germany, the appeal court of Munich (Oberlandesgericht München) 
struck down the exclusive arbitration clause of a sport association as 
invalid.200  Thirdly, the parties to disputes are often able to rely on FIFA's 
internal mechanisms to ensure that CAS awards are enforced, but, like any 
arbitral award, they might need the help of state courts.201  Some courts, 
like the Swiss and the French, apply a very light review, but some are more 
critical: for example, in the Wilhelmshaven case, a German court held that 
it could not enforce a CAS award without going against public policy, 
194. See Burgess Williams, The Fate of Third Party Ownership of Professional
Footballers' Rights: Is a Complete Prohibition Necessary?, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 79, 
95–96 (2009). 
195. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 64.2.
196. See, e.g., Ian Blackshaw, ADR and Sport: Settling Disputes through the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, and the WIPO Arbitration and 
Mediation Center, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV., 1, 38 (2013). 
197. See infra notes 213–214 and accompanying text.
198. For the discussion of some examples, see infra Part IV.B.
199. See Reilly, supra note 120, at 67.
200. See OLG München, Jan. 15, 2015, Az. U 1110/14 Kart.  The case involves Claudia
Pechstein, a speedskater, but could set a precedent.  The decision of the Munich regional court 
has been reversed recently by Germany's Federal Court of Justice, but the athlete considers filing 
a complaint with the German constitutional court; a related case is pending before the European 
Court of Human Rights.  See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sports Arbitration Court Ruling against German 
Speedskater Claudia Pechstein is Upheld, NYTIMES.COM FEED (Jun. 7, 2016), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/sports/sports-arbitration-court-ruling-against-german-
speedskater-claudia-pechstein-is-upheld.html?_r=0.  See also Duval, supra note 122, at 249–50; 
Despina Mavromati, The Legality of the Arbitration Agreement in Favour of CAS under German 
Civil and Competition Law, CAS BULL., no. 1, 2016, at 27, 28–30. 
201. See McLaren, supra note 120, at 324.
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namely the EU laws concerning free movement.202  Therefore, by ignoring 
public laws, FIFA and CAS might expose themselves to outside 
interference.203 
B. Keeping Governments and Public Courts at Bay: Mechanisms for
Advancing the Exclusive Use of the Private Legal Order 
Part IV.A shows that FIFA's rules and regulations, particularly 
player transfer rules and the exclusivity of official tournaments organized 
under the helm of FIFA, may be in conflict with the laws of nation states 
and supra-national jurisdictions.204  This implies that FIFA members, 
clubs, footballers, and other involved actors have strong grounds to 
challenge the established rules and decisions of FIFA or CAS in public 
courts with the purpose of avoiding obligations or limitations imposed on 
them by these rules and decisions.  This, indeed, happened previously.205 
Incentives of the involved actors to challenge FIFA's private legal 
order are particularly strong where the established rules of behavior 
contradict the interests of a specific group of actors.  The main two groups 
of actors include clubs and footballers.  Although neither of the two is 
directly represented in FIFA or regional confederations, both have 
established external networks to influence football governance.206  In 
particular, both clubs and players have representative organizations that 
promote their interests in football matters.  The European Club 
Association (ECA), headquartered in Nyon, Switzerland, counts among its 
members 200 clubs from 53 European member associations of FIFA.207  
FIFPro, based in Hoofddorp, the Netherlands, is the worldwide 
202. See OLG Bremen, Dec. 30, 2014, 2 U 67/14.  See also Duval, supra note 122, at 248–
49. 
203. See Duval, supra note 122, at 254; Reilly, supra note 120, at 80.
204. See supra Part IV.A.
205. Two cases are described in this article.  See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying
text and infra notes 235–236 and accompanying text (describing FC Sion and Matuzalem affairs, 
respectively). 
206. See Matthew Holt, The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in
European Football, 8 SOCCER & SOC'Y 50, 54, 61 (2007) (distinguishing between internal and 
external governance in football and describing the means of external governance available to 
stakeholders). 
207. See http://www.ecaeurope.com/eca-members/eca-members/ (listing all current ECA
members).  The interests of wealthy and powerful clubs, however, are overrepresented in ECA.  
See Michele Colucci & Arnout Geeraert, Social Dialogue in European Professional Football, 
INT'L SPORTS L.J., no. 3–4, 2011, at 56, 64.  Football clubs are also indirectly represented by the 
Association of European Professional Football Leagues (EPFL).  Id., at 63. 
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representative organization for more than 65,000 professional footballers, 
both male and female.208  It has 58 national players' associations as its 
members currently.209  Had clubs or players acted separately, they would 
have lacked incentives to deviate from the established private legal order 
even if it contradicted their interests. 
First, the desire of each actor to leave may be constrained by the 
equilibrium—if all other actors are satisfied with the status quo the 
motives of separate actors to deviate are weakened.210  They have to 
predict the behavior of other actors and act accordingly.  If the dissatisfied 
actor is not likely to be joined by others, costs of his/her actions are high.211  
For example, before breaching the existing player transfer rules, a player 
has to examine the probability of being hired by other clubs after the 
breach.  If the breach leads to an effective ostracism, a player may stick to 
the rules even if he/she disagrees with them.  The likelihood to find a new 
club is certainly higher when many others, and hopefully all, boycott the 
transfer rules. 
Second, cases challenging the rules of established private orders 
require accumulation of substantial financial resources and time.  Sport 
associations clearly realize that most of the individual athletes lack both.212  
Moreover, "rebellious" athletes may be banned from competitions during 
the entire period of judicial proceedings.  Given the length of legal battles 
and the limited span of sport careers, such challenges, in fact, are likely to 
end the athlete's career.213  Add to this possible negative public opinion 
208. See https://www.fifpro.org/en/about-fifpro/about-fifpro.
209. See id.  It is difficult to conclude which interest group is stronger, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that some clubs strongly discourage their players from being affiliated with 
FIFPro, thereby weakening the representation of the players' interests.  We obtained this 
information during an interview with an ex-legal counsel at a FIFA member association (Sep. 6, 
2016).  This practice, however, might be limited to particular countries and be induced by 
personal hostility between top officials of clubs and national players' unions. 
210. See Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 1420, 1424–25 (1978) (showing that for explaining outcomes of collective actions, 
in addition to individual preferences of all actors, we need to know how these individual 
preferences interact). 
211. See id. at 1422.
212. Commenting on the case initiated by speedskater Claudia Pechstein against exclusive
arbitration clauses, CAS Secretary General noted: "I don't think every athlete in the world can 
afford this kind of marathon," referring to Ms. Pechstein's seven-year legal battle.  Accordingly, 
he did not expect many similar suits.  See Ruiz, supra note 200. 
213. For example, Jean-Marc Bosman had to sacrifice his career and endure a long legal
battle to challenge the then-effective transfer rules of football players.  See Stefaan Van den 
Bogaert, Editorial, Bosman: One for All . . ., 22 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 174, 178 
(2015).  Less known is the story of Carlos Gonzalez Puche, an ex-footballer who had to hang up 
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surrounding the cases, and there is a strong case against challenging the 
established order.214 
Third, challenging the existing rules, which contradict formal law, 
in state courts involves classic collective action and free-rider problems.215  
Even though multiple actors might all benefit from changing the rules, 
bringing a challenge in state courts is associated with a cost which makes 
it unlikely that any individual actor will move alone.216  The costs of such 
action will be borne by the activist, whereas the benefits will be shared by 
all other affected actors.217  Hence, such activism is a public good which 
is better accomplished if the actors act collectively and share the costs.218  
But if collective action is associated with costs as well, then there always 
will be free-riding actors which increase the costs shared by others and 
thereby discourage any action.219  As a result, the actors may be trapped in 
a sub-optimal equilibrium. 
Acting as an interest group, the likes of ECA and FIFPro deal with 
the described problems and, as a result, strengthen the voice of the actors 
they represent.220  The question is what the interests of the two main 
involved groups, players and clubs, are?  FIFPro is dissatisfied with the 
current transfer system and is interested in changes.221  One of its main 
motivations is that the existing rules fail to correct financial imbalances 
his boots early due to a "club cartel that blacklisted players fighting for their rights."  He dared 
to speak out about the oppressed rights of players in Colombia in 1980s, an era when the 
country's big clubs were under the control of drug barons, and later, with the help of FIFpro and 
high-profile Colombian players, set up a union to represent players in disputes with clubs.  These 
efforts, arguably, contributed to reducing the influence of the criminal underworld over 
Colombian football and led to fairer and more professional relationships between players and 
clubs.  See Carl Worswick, Colombia's Finest, WORLD SOCCER, Dec. 2016, at 70, 72. 
214. After the Bosman ruling, Mr. Bosman was portrayed as the villain who had inflicted 
irreparable harm to football.  Van den Bogaert, supra note 213, at 175. 
215. A collective action problem arises when there is a conflict between a behavior that
maximizes the welfare of an individual and the individual's behavior that maximizes the welfare 
of the group to which he/she belongs.  See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 8–9, 16–22 
(1982); OLSON, supra note 40, at 5–16. 
216. See KEITH DOWDING, POWER 33 ff. (1996); OLSON, supra note 40, at 5–16.
217. See OLSON, supra note 40, at 13–15.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 40–41.
220. Indeed, these interest groups, brokered by the European Commission and UEFA, are 
involved in a social dialogue with the aim of improving the practices of employee protections in 
football.  See Colucci & Geeraert, supra note 207, at 57–58. 
221. See Gavin Hamilton & Keir Radnedge, 20 Stories to Follow in 2016: Will FIFPro
Win Its Legal Challenge to the Transfer System?, WORLD SOCCER, Jan. 2016, at 25. 
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between big and small clubs.222  Although FIFPro has not specified the 
preferred alternative, it is clear that formal law is not the solution: FIFPro 
is rather interested in overhauling the current system.223  ECA, on the other 
hand, seems to be in strong favor of preserving the status quo.224  
Notwithstanding the divergence in the interests of the two main interest 
groups, legal challenges to the private legal order are rare.  The parties 
rather prefer to preserve the order and modernize it to accommodate their 
interests.225 
To avoid outside challenges, FIFA Statutes prohibit recourse to 
outside dispute resolution venues, including ordinary state-sponsored 
courts.226  This prohibition extends to obtaining provisional measures—
such as restraining orders, asset freezing orders, or provision of security 
for costs.227  FIFA sanctions non-complying members directly and requires 
them to establish effective mechanisms discouraging actors that are 
outside FIFA's direct reach from taking actions in national courts.228  For 
example, FIFA can suspend a member association should it fail to 
discipline local actors, meaning that neither the national team, nor local 
clubs can participate in official tournaments.  This collective responsibility 
scheme provides all involved actors with incentives to promote 
compliance with the rules and intensifies pressure on individual 
wrongdoers.229 
The practice indicates that clubs and players challenge FIFA's rules 
in state courts when they face dire consequences that can threaten their 
existence (for clubs) or careers (for players).  To avoid this, the rules 
promote sanctions that do not create such a classic end-game problem.230  
222. See id. ("Some stars [players] are incredibly wealthy but in small clubs and small
countries there is almost slavery.  . . .  FIFPro would like to make the system much more 
equable."). 
223. See id. (FIFPro is not intent on scrapping the transfer system altogether; it just wants
to bring "balance between the rights of players and the clubs"). 
224. See id.
225. Rare instances of challenging FIFA's rules by various stakeholder interest groups are 
strategically motivated.  See, e.g., Colucci & Geeraert, supra note 207, at 63–64 (describing the 
use of public courts by G-14, an informal network of leading football clubs in Europe, to 
strengthen its position in negotiations to obtain from football governing bodies compensation 
for clubs if players are injured while representing their national teams). 
226. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 1, art. 68.2.
227. Id.
228. See id. art. 70; DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 64.1 (d).
229. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text.
230. In a similar vein, Professor Bernstein notes that the Board of Arbitrators of the New
York Diamond Dealers Club uses suspension more frequently than expulsion to secure 
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As described above, the sanctions provide for temporary bans to play 
football for players or register new players for clubs.231  Clubs may also 
be relegated to lower divisions or banned from participating in 
international tournaments for a specific period of time.232  But permanent 
banes are rare: they are typically imposed to promote compliance with 
already instituted sanctions.  However, large sums of material fines related 
to the breach of employment contracts can be equivalent to a temporary 
ban, particularly for players who cannot afford paying huge compensation 
amounts associated with breaching transfer rules.233  To avoid a scenario 
when a player hit with a large fine and unable to pay it launches a war 
against FIFA in state courts, the rules impose joint and several liability 
both on the player and his/her new club.234  This means that if a player fails 
to pay, the club is obliged to make the payment.  Accordingly, the player 
has less incentives to take the dispute to state courts.  Not surprisingly, one 
of the rare challenges of the CAS awards in state courts took place when 
the compensation sum was beyond the financial means of the player and 
the jointly liable club; moreover, the club was in insolvency proceedings 
and the player had to bear the entire burden alone.235  Not able to pay, the 
player took the case to Swiss federal courts, arguing that the ban from 
playing football imposed on him for the failure to comply with the CAS 
award violated the fundamental principles of public policy.236 
This discussion shows that FIFA's private legal order is effective in 
locking all involved actors as long as it does not impose excessive 
sanctions creating an end-game situation.  In result, even though separate 
actors or even some interest groups may be interested in replacing it with 
an alternative, they do not have incentives to exit the system.  This, 
however, does not mean that the existing system is efficient.  Nevertheless, 
compliance with its decisions.  "The expelled member may feel like he has nothing to lose by 
challenging the club.”  Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 10, at 129.  See also Jack 
Hirshleifer, Anarchy and Its Breakdown, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 26, 30–33 (1995) (showing that a 
spontaneous order can be sustained when (1) the decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently low and 
(2) income inadequacy is not large enough to push some participants beyond the line of survival).
231. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (describing the typical sanctions for
breaching transfer rules that may be imposed on players, and clubs, respectively). 
232. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (describing other possible sanctions that
may be imposed on clubs). 
233. See, e.g., Matuzalem, supra note 82, para. 179 (where the CAS award ordered Mr.
Matuzalem, who breached his employment contract with FC Shakhtar Donetsk, to pay a fine 
approximating €12 million). 
234. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 17.2.
235. See Parrish, supra note 192, at 264–65 (describing the saga of the Matuzalem case).
236. See id.
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the absence of coordinated actions against the system by the involved 
actors in state courts is a strong suggestion that the private legal order 
provides something that is not offered by its state-provided alternatives.  
In the following section, we show the advantages of the private order as 
opposed to formal law. 
V. ADVANTAGES OF THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER
After describing FIFA's private legal order—explaining how it 
operates in practice and what are the incentives of the involved actors—
we turn to the discussion of the reasons for the development of the private 
legal order.  Although tempting, we do not put forward an efficiency 
hypothesis that explains FIFA's role in governing football-related behavior 
by its ability to increase the collective gains of the involved actors.  To 
establish this we would need to show that FIFA's rules are not merely 
redistributing gains among different involved actors, but are creating an 
added value.  Given many path dependencies, this is a task difficult to 
achieve.237  Accordingly, we propose that the private legal order owes its 
existence to the shortcomings of the alternatives.  Unlike other available 
governance modes, the private order has been able to offer advantages that 
others failed to provide.238  Some of these advantages—such as 
harmonized rules, effective mechanisms of deterring their breach, and 
lower costs of enforcement—are commonly discussed in the literature on 
237. See supra notes 210–219 and accompanying text.  Available evidence points to the
direction that some rules have redistributive effect.  For instance, the average employment 
contract length increased by about 6 months (or 20%) after the Bosman ruling, thus 
strengthening player security.  See Bernd Frick, The Football Players' Labor Market: Empirical 
Evidence from the Major European Leagues, 54 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 422, 437 (2007).  The 
reality may be more complicated, as some rules may not merely affect the position of players 
versus clubs, but the outcomes may vary for different classes of players (i.e., depending on age, 
performance, nationality) and clubs (i.e., depending on wealth).  When some of these nuances 
are taken into account, abolishing transfer rules is expected to increase player salaries, but 
players' gains are not sufficient to cover the losses suffered by clubs, thus reducing the joint 
surplus.  See Marko Terviö, Transfer Fee Regulations and Player Development, 4 J. EUR. ECON. 
ASS'N 957, 969–72 (2006). 
238. See, e.g., Bernstein, The Cotton Industry, supra note 10, at 1739 (arguing that the
benefits of a private legal order stem from structures that improve on aspects of the public legal 
system); Prüfer, supra note 46, at 309 (noting that where non-contractibility or too high 
transaction costs make state governance no available option, private institutions can mitigate 
cooperation problems).  See also supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text (discussing the 
efficiency of private orders). 
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private legal orders, whereas others—such as incentives for developing 
players—are specific to football. 
A. Substituting a Patchwork of National Laws with Common Rules
Applicable across Countries 
One of the main reasons for the emergence of transnational private 
orders is the need to overcome fragmented regulatory regimes created by 
diverse state legislations.  Indeed, actors often opt out of formal law and 
form private orders where their activities transcend national borders and 
are subject to competing regulatory regimes.239  Football is not a special 
case.  It would be complicated to establish level playing field if clubs were 
to compete under different rules.  Under the current regime, although 
national football authorities are responsible for organizing local 
competitions, they act within the minimum requirements of FIFA and 
regional confederations.  The opposite would be a myriad of national 
associations with their own rules.  Accordingly, clubs and players in some 
countries would receive lighter regulation than in others.  Likewise, 
similar behavior would be subject to different consequences in various 
jurisdictions.  This would drive talented players and investments to clubs 
from a handful countries, thus effectively excluding others from 
competition. 
Uniform rules cover not only employment matters, but also dates for 
organizing international fixtures and periods during which clubs are 
allowed to register new players.  Uncoordinated dates for competitions 
may lead to clashes between different games forcing a player to choose 
between his/her national team and a club.  Similarly, uniformity, or at least 
similarity, across different countries regarding player registration periods, 
also known as "transfer windows," allows player mobility without causing 
major disruptions to national tournaments.240  Otherwise, major transfers 
from a club in the most crucial period of the season would disorganize the 
team and upset its tournament plans.  Consequently, although it is up to 
member associations to define specific time-frames of registration periods, 
the current tendency is towards uniformity of periods among the different 
associations, not only within the same confederation, but also among 
239. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. 
& SOC'Y 20, 25 (2011); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 327–28 
(2002). 
240. FIFA COMMENTARY, supra note 77, art. 6, comment no. 2.
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associations belonging to different confederations.241  The first transfer 
window, which usually is open during the entire summer, is the main 
period and is used by the clubs to set up their squads for the forthcoming 
season.242  The second shorter period opens in the winter, which 
approximately corresponds to the middle of the season, and is intended to 
provide clubs with an opportunity to adjust their squads or replace injured 
players.243 
B. Strengthening Predictability by the Means of Ensuring Stable
Contractual Relations 
As discussed earlier, one of the stark contrasts of FIFA's private 
order from public laws is the private order's strong adherence to the 
principle of contractual stability in employment relations.244  This makes 
a big difference in dealing with potential hardships in replacing players 
that depart unexpectedly in the middle of a season.  Football has very 
specific needs that leverage the importance of human capital.  Players are 
the main asset of a club, both from sporting and economic perspective.245  
Clubs invest considerable resources in intelligent squad building.246  They 
organize extensive pre-season and mid-season training camps and develop 
playing schemes around players at their disposal.  An entire game pattern 
can be built on the skills of specific players.  Unexpected departures can 
thus leave gaps that are not easy to fill promptly. 
Players not only contribute their sporting abilities to the team for 
which they play, but also are valuable assets in the balance sheet of a 
club.247  Clubs typically pay significant amounts to sign their star players, 
they generate revenues by using these players' value for merchandising 
activities, and expect to recover their investments either by achieving 
successful sporting results with the help of players over long-term or by 
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text.
245. See FC Pyunik, supra note 107, para. 82.
246. See Murad Ahmed, Big-Money: Beautiful Game Splashes Out £1bn, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2016, at 15 (reporting that during the three-month summer period in 2016 when 
clubs can sign players, English top-league football clubs broke all previous records spending 
more than £1 billion on new players); John Burn-Murdoch, The Baseline, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Jan. 11, 2016 (noting that every football season billions of pounds change hands in transferring 
players among clubs). 
247. See FC Pyunik, supra note 107, para. 82.
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releasing players prior to the expiry of their contracts in exchange of hefty 
transfer fees.248  The resulting economic reality in the world of football is 
that the services provided by a player are attributed an economic value and 
are traded and sought after on the market.249  This reality pressured FIFA 
to offer legal protection for the rights of clubs to the services of players.250  
For this reason, FIFA aims to reinforce contractual stability.  The 
main purpose of art. 17 of the Transfer Regulations in the light of its 
interpretation by CAS is to deter unilateral contract terminations, whether 
by players or clubs.251  Contractual stability increases certainty.  
Accordingly, a club that develops a player, or secures the services of a 
player by paying a large transfer fee, or builds its game around a group of 
players can plan for a longer term without a fear that its arrangements will 
be shattered by unexpected player exits.  And if a player walks away 
prematurely, the club can expect compensation—an important source of 
income, specifically for clubs that do not have access to extensive 
broadcasting, commercial, and game attendance revenues.252  This allows 
many small clubs to retain competitiveness by securing replacements for 
leaving players.253 
Compensation itself may not be enough to deter violations of the 
established rules of behavior.  Many private orders make opportunistic 
behavior extremely costly by spreading information about the reputation 
of their members.254  When future dealings with the fellow members and 
non-economic benefits, like community status, are conditioned upon good 
reputation, deviations from the established rules do not only lead to costs 
associated with the compensation of actual damages, but also create 
additional opportunity costs.255 
As discussed earlier, reputation plays insignificant role in 
football.256  To compensate for this, FIFA rules, along with making the 
principle of contractual stability the cornerstone of employment relations 
in football, create incentives for the enforcement of the principle.  First, 
248. See id.
249. See Matuzalem, supra note 82, para. 103.
250. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 17.
251. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
252. See Czarnota, supra note 182, at 8–9.
253. See id. at 9.
254. See Richman, supra note 16, at 2335 (showing that many works on private orders
uncovered similarly organized reputation mechanisms that induced certain mutually and socially 
beneficial behavior). 
255. See id. at 2344–45.
256. See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text.
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additional sanctions are applied jointly to the more traditional punishment 
of damage compensation.  Temporary bans imposed on players to practice 
football and on clubs to sign new players aim to promote compliance with 
the rules.257  Their equivalents are not available in formal law and, 
accordingly, cannot be applied by public courts.  Second, the rules 
promote compliance with the principle by allocating liability for its breach.  
The rule of strict liability, according to which a club that signs a player 
who has unilaterally terminated his/her contract is jointly and severally 
liable for the payment of a compensation, regardless of the club's 
involvement in inducing the breach, has a discouraging effect on clubs 
considering to offer employment to deviating players.258  By limiting 
employment opportunities, this further strengthens contractual stability. 
The rule of strict liability for "player poaching" places the 
responsibility for the risk of breaching a contract with the lowest cost risk 
avoider, so that this party has an incentive to limit the possible occurrence 
of those risks.  A party with such an incentive will take the steps necessary 
to reduce the risk, thereby avoiding both the costs of the danger 
manifesting and saving another party, someone to whom avoidance would 
come at a higher price, from taking less efficient measures.  Particularly, 
if a player from one club, club A, illegally signs with or transfers to another 
club, club B, it will be presumed that this latter club, club B, enticed the 
player to sign with them.259  The club will thus be held liable.  Proof of 
whether or not club B actually "poached" the player is unnecessary: in any 
dispute resolution, club B will be jointly and severally liable for the 
payment of a compensation.260  This provides club B with an incentive not 
to illegally sign players from other teams: club B is perhaps the lowest cost 
risk avoider in the case of poaching because for regulatory bodies or club 
A to prevent the player to move illegally they would have to take far more 
extensive measures: club A might, in the extreme, have to monitor its each 
257. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (describing sporting sanctions for the
breach of transfer rules). 
258. See Parrish, supra note 192, at 270–71.
259. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 17 (4).
260. See id.  art. 17 (2).  This rule is of an objective nature and does not require that the 
new club be considered as instigator of the player's breach.  See Ascoli Calcio 1898 S.p.A. v. 
Papa Waigo N'diaye & Al Wahda Sports and Cultural Club, CAS 2014/A/3852, para. 110 (Jan. 
2016).  However, if club B can prove it had nothing to do with the transfer, it might still avoid 
liability.  See, e.g., Al Gharafa S.C. & Mark Bresciano v. Al Nasr S.C. & Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), CAS 2013/A/3411, para. 6 (May 2014).  This is 
to ensure that the strict rule does not become too costly: clubs might be very hesitant to sign 
with any players if they were always suspect. 
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player's every move constantly.  Club B just has to refrain from doing 
something.  Furthermore, investigation into actual collusion can be 
expensive and hard.  A rule of strict liability saves this cost, too.261 
C. Giving Clubs Incentives to Invest in Training Young Players
Football education, unlike general education, is rarely publicly 
funded and thus requires private investments.  Football academies are 
often operated by or have links to clubs.  Although players under the age 
of 18 are allowed to sign professional contracts, only a small proportion 
of talented youngsters are able to land such contracts.262  Hence, many are 
amateurs without contracts that tie them to a specific club and are free to 
move, at least within the country of their residence.263  The right of young 
players to move from football academies and less known clubs to leading 
football clubs distorts the incentives of the former to invest in the training 
of young players. 
FIFA's Transfer Regulations include rules that financially motivate 
football academies and clubs, particularly in less developed and advancing 
countries, to invest in training young players.  After a player signs his/her 
first professional contract and each time a player is transferred from one 
261. In a similar manner, and with similar incentives, does FIFA employ a rule of strict
liability for match-fixing (if any club official has done so, the club will be held responsible if it 
cannot demonstrate innocence) and a rule holding clubs strictly liable for the behavior of their 
fans.  See Public Joint-Stock Company "Football Club Metalist" v. Union des Associations 
Européennes de Football (UEFA) & PAOK FC, CAS 2013/A/3297, para. 3 (Nov. 2013) (for 
match-fixing); DISCIPLINARY CODE, supra note 4, art. 67.1 (for fans' misbehavior).  The latter
might seem a tall order, but clubs are perhaps often the party with the closest connection to their 
fans and the ones with the most information and understanding of their own fans, making them 
the lowest cost risk avoider, even if they cannot avoid everything. 
262. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 18 (2).  Contracts with players under
the age of 18 may not be longer than three years—a limitation that aims to promote career 
development and progress of young players by preventing clubs from excessively tying in 
players at an age when their bargaining power is, as a rule, weak. 
263. Only players over the age of 18 are eligible for international transfers.  TRANSFER
REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 19 (1).  There are three exceptions to this rule: (1) where the 
player's parents, for reasons not linked to football, move to the country where the new club is 
located; (2) the player lives no further than 50 kilometers from a national border and the new 
club in the neighboring association is located within the same distance of that border; or (3) the 
transfer takes place within the European Union or the European Economic Area and the player's 
age is above 16.  TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 19 (2).  The last special geographic
exception is, indeed, the result of the requirement to ensure the freedom of movement among 
EU member states.  See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text (briefing the Bosman case 
and its outcomes). 
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club to another until the end of the season of his/her 23rd birthday, clubs 
that contributed to the player's training are entitled to a training 
compensation.264  The period between the age of 12 and 21 is normally 
considered as a player's training period.265  On signing the first contract as 
a professional, the new club must pay training compensation to every club 
with which the player has previously been registered during the training 
period.266  If the player changes the club again until the end of the season 
of his/her 23rd birthday, the last club has a right to receive training 
compensation for the period the player was effectively trained by that 
club.267  Accordingly, every club where an athlete played during the age 
of 12 and 21 is eligible for a training compensation.  However, it is 
possible for a player to complete his/her training period earlier.268  A major 
indication of the completion of a player's training period is regular 
performance for a club's main team; other possible factors include the 
player's value at a club (for instance, reflected in the salary), public 
notoriety, or regular playing time in the national team.269 
The rules for calculating training compensation aim to discourage 
clubs in developed countries from hiring talented young players in less 
developed countries only because the training costs in less developed 
countries are lower.270  Therefore, training compensation a new rich club 
must pay a player's foreign training club is calculated based on the training 
costs in the country of the new club.271  The training compensation is thus 
a reward, which gives football academies and clubs incentives to train 
players, rather than a mere refund of the costs of training.272 
In addition to training compensation, former clubs of a transferring 
player have a right to receive solidarity contribution.273  The purpose of 
this payment is similar—supporting the training of young players by 
clubs.274  Yet, there are important differences.  Unlike training 
264. TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 20.  Training compensation is not due
for a period after the completion of training. 
265. Id. Annexe 4, art. 1 (1).
266. Id. Annexe 4, art. 3 (1).
267. Id.
268. See id. Annexe 4, art. 1 (1).
269. See Jean-Philippe Dubey, The Jurisprudence of the CAS in Football Matters (Except
Art. 17 RSTP), CAS BULL., no. 1, 2011, at 3, 8. 
270. See id.
271. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, Annexe 4, art. 5 (1).
272. See CD Nacional SAD v. CA Cerro, CAS 2015/A/3981, para. 81 (Nov. 2015).
273. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, art. 21.
274. See Dubey, supra note 269, at 9.
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compensation, which a club can get only once, solidarity contribution is 
paid to the player's all former clubs that have contributed to his/her training 
upon every transfer, regardless of the age.  Total solidarity contribution 
equals 5% of a compensation (transfer fee or transfer amount) paid by the 
player's new club to the former club.275  Thus, it is due only if a player 
moves from one club to another before the expiry of the existing 
contract.276  Each club receives a specific proportion of the total solidarity 
contribution according to the length of a period it contributed to the 
training of a transferring player.277 
In sum, the described rules reward smaller clubs financially and give 
them reasons to remain under the clout of the private order. 
D. Correcting Market Failures by Tailored Contracting Practices
FIFA regulations and the practice of CAS respect the freedom of 
contract and enforce provisions agreed by the parties, first and foremost 
players and clubs, in their contracts.278  When the preferred contracting 
practices in a given industry cannot be enforcement in state courts, 
membership in private associations that offer enforcement support 
increases in its attractiveness.279  Legal counsel of clubs and players have 
designed various contractual mechanisms that correct market failures 
associated with cooperation.  Because not all of these mechanisms can be 
275. See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, Annexe 5, art. 1.
276. See id.  Since a player is free to transfer to any club after the expiry of an existing
contract, such transfers, in the absence of compensation paid by the player's new club to his/her 
former club, do not trigger solidarity contributions. 
277. Proportions of solidarity contribution due to the player's former training clubs are 
defined in Annexe 5 of the Transfer Regulations.  Clubs involved in the early years of training 
of a player are entitled to 0.25% of the total solidarity contribution for each year of training, 
whereas each subsequent year of training confers a right to receive 0.10% of the total 
contribution.  See TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 4, Annexe 5, art. 1.
278. See, e.g., Shakhtar Donetsk v. Ilson Pereira Dias Junior, CAS 2010/O/2132, paras.
49–52 (Sep. 2011) (the employment contract between the Ukrainian club and Brazilian player 
Ilsinho stipulated that unless the club sold the player's rights during the first year of employment, 
the parties would extend the four-year contract by another year under the threat of a heavy fine 
equaling the player's one-year salary; the CAS enforced this clause as valid agreement between 
the player and the club). 
279. See Banner, supra note 6, at 125–26 (arguing the New York Stock and Exchange
Board's ability to enforce "time bargains," or what we would today call futures transactions, was 
a major incentive for securities traders to join the board; these transactions, which were common 
practice, could not be enforced in New York's courts until 1858). 
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enforced in state courts, the private legal order adds value to the 
transactions governed by its rules. 
As an illustration, consider information asymmetries between clubs 
in the case of transferring players (it is not uncommon when players fail 
to adapt to the new environment or are not a good fit to the new club's 
squad) and contractual techniques for dealing with them.  These failures 
are corrected by contractual sell-on or conditional transfer fee clauses, thus 
facilitating cooperation.  Under a sell-on clause, if the new club transfers 
the player to a third club for a compensation exceeding the compensation 
paid to the player's old club, the old club is entitled to receive a portion of 
the transfer fee expressed as a percentage of the capital gain made by the 
new club.280  In fact, the transfer fee is divided in two components: a fixed 
amount due at the time of the transfer of a player to a new club, and a 
variable, notional amount, payable to the old club in the event of a 
subsequent transfer of the player from the new club to a third club.281  This 
increases the total transfer fee the old club receives for releasing its player.  
A similar mechanism is offered by contingent transfer fee clauses.  
Likewise, the transfer amount has two parts: a fixed amount and a 
contingent amount depending on the future performance of the transferred 
player in the new club or of the new club.282  Not surprisingly, both clauses 
are not enforceable under traditional employment laws. 
Loan agreements between clubs, which are supposed to meet the 
short-term needs of clubs to find replacement for injured players, can also 
be used to mitigate information asymmetries.  According to a loan 
agreement, a player employed by one party plays for the other club during 
a specific period.283  Often such contracts contain a buy option allowing 
280. See, e.g., Sevilla FC v. RC Lens, CAS 2010/A/2098, paras. 4–5 (Nov. 2010) (in 2007,
Racing Club de Lens agreed to release its player Seydou Keita to Sevilla Fútbol Club SAD for 
the transfer fee of €4 million; according to the transfer agreement, in case of the subsequent 
transfer of the player from Sevilla FC to another club, RC Lens had to receive 10% of the capital 
gain between €4 million and €8 million and 15% beyond €8 million). 
281. See id. para. 49.
282. See, e.g., Agreement for Transfer of Registration of Mesut Özil between Real Madrid
Club de Fútbol and The Arsenal Football Club PLC, FOOTBALL LEAKS (Sep. 1, 2013), available 
at https://footballleaks2015.wordpress.com (in addition to the fixed transfer amount of €44 
million, the old club was entitled to a contingent transfer compensation in the maximum amount 
of €6 million depending on the qualification of the new club to play in the UEFA Champions 
League, a prestigious club tournament in Europe). 
283. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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the borrowing club to sign the player permanently if satisfied with the 
player's contribution to its squad.284 
Another example is the use of liquidated damages clauses or 
penalties.  When it comes to the enforcement of these clauses, national 
legislations vary significantly.  Penalty clauses are invalid in some 
jurisdictions, whereas courts may reduce the contractually agreed amount 
of a penalty in others.285  The amount of initially agreed liquidated 
damages, similarly, cannot be discretionary and must be a reasonable 
estimation of the expected damages.286  Under FIFA's Transfer 
Regulations, meanwhile, contractual liquidated damages clauses have 
clear priority over other rules and cannot be reduced by a third-party 
decision-maker.287 
FIFA has designed effective mechanisms for enforcing the 
described contracting practices.288  Recourse to ordinary state courts will 
undermine these practices because most cannot be enforced under national 
legislations.  When the private group's enforcement mechanisms are 
superior to the enforcement by state courts, public involvement reduces 
the group's ability to regulate its members.289  For example, when a state 
court rejects to enforce a contract valid under FIFA rules, both the rules 
and the private enforcement mechanisms become weaker.  Differing 
approaches of courts from various jurisdictions toward the tailored 
contracting practices of football-related actors result in increased 
uncertainty, thereby reinforcing speculative incentives to litigate in courts 
instead of using the internal dispute resolution bodies.  Not surprisingly, 
FIFA has concentrated its efforts on the allocation of institutional 
284. For example, FC Bayern Munich exercised an option to sign Kingsley Coman, a
talented French youngster, following the player's successful stint in the club during the first year 
of his two-year loan move from Juventus F.C.  See Rhodri Cannon, Bayern Munich Set to 
Activate Option to Buy Kingsley Coman, Reveals Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, MAILONLINE, Aug. 
4, 2016.  A.S. Roma has been pursuing the policy of signing players on temporary loan 
agreements and activating buy options if the players meet the club's expectations.  See, e.g., 
Oliver Todd, Mo Salah and Edin Dzeko Bag Permanent Roma Deals after Italians Activate 
Clauses, MAILONLINE, Oct. 3, 2015. 
285. See Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 
43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 433, 435–38 (1995) (describing the common law ban on penalty clauses 
and the approaches of legislators and courts in modern civil law countries). 
286. See id. at 435–36.
287. See Vladimir Mukhanov v. FC Aktobe, CAS 2014/A/3640 (Jan. 2014).
288. See supra Part III.C.
289. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 156, 185 (1996). 
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responsibility for resolving football-related disputes.290  Its rules 
discourage bringing matters governed by the private order into the realm 
of state courts: should there be contractual disputes involving clubs, 
players, or other actors, they are subject to exclusive adjudication by 
FIFA's (or its member association's) internal dispute resolution bodies and 
by the specialized CAS. 
E. Arbitration
One more reason FIFA may be attractive for its members and other 
football-related actors is the arbitration system.  Disputes are solved by 
highly-specialized third-party decision-makers—national arbitration 
institutes formed by domestic football associations or CAS.  Narrow 
specialization of arbiters increases the quality of dispute resolution 
without the expense of increased time and costs of considering cases.  This 
leads to two major outcomes.  First, inside information available to 
arbitrators specialized on football-related disputes expands the ability of 
the involved actors to contract over terms that would be difficult to explain 
and verify to generalist courts.291  CAS, for example, has less stringent 
rules on evidence,292 which adds to the verifiable knowledge of parties.  As 
arbitrators are bound first by FIFA rules and CAS rules, they also have 
greater discretion to take into account matters that are peculiar to sport, 
and can be more knowledgeable concerning the needs of the parties to a 
dispute, for example, of the impact a breach of contract is likely to have 
on either side in a specific case.293  Second, specialized arbitration by one 
decision-making body instead of many national courts increases certainty 
by making the applicable rules more predictable.294 
In addition, specialization also reduces the costs of dispute 
resolution: arbitrators normally deliver decisions in periods that are much 
shorter than the periods required from state courts in many countries to 
consider similar cases; arbitral procedures are also simpler and less 
formal.295  FIFA's internal dispute resolution bodies and CAS are said to 
290. See supra Part IV.B (describing the mechanisms employed by FIFA promoting the
exclusive use of the private legal order). 
291. See generally supra note 21.
292. See, e.g., Samuel Inkoom v. Andrew Evans & Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA), CAS 2015/A/3961, paras. 78–79 (Dec. 2015). 
293. See Reilly, supra note 120, at 65–66.
294. See generally Richman, supra note 16, at 2341.
295. See Charny, supra note 21, at 410.
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deliver their judgments faster than an ordinary judicial proceeding could 
do, which, given the time-pressure on resolution, particularly in the field 
of sport, is seen as an advantage.296  Often, resolution is needed as soon as 
possible for athletes and clubs to know whether they can, for example, 
compete in the next tournament.297  To further improve this, CAS 
sometimes expedites proceedings and declares the operational part of an 
award well before publishing the full decision, so that all parties may 
continue their normal activities as soon as possible.298  Lastly, when it 
comes to disputes between parties with different nationalities, FIFA's 
internal dispute resolution bodies and CAS act as impartial third-party 
decision-makers that are not biased towards any of the disputing parties.299 
Normally, arbitration comes with a downside.  Adjudication in state 
courts is a public good that supplies the market with interpretations of 
laws.300  Under widespread arbitration, which is commonly conducted in 
secret, case law is underprovided.301  The situation is different in close-
knit groups with their own "in-house" dispute resolution systems, because 
such groups can share the costs of precedents among all group members, 
thereby creating incentives for arbitrators to produce written and publicly-
available opinions.302  Indeed, CAS publishes some, but not all, of its 
awards, summarizing some others in the CAS Bulletin, the official 
publication of the court, and neglecting the rest.303  The latter seems to be 
rather in the interest of expediency than privacy of the parties.  
Nevertheless, sport lawyers, as members of a close-knit group, are likely 
to be aware about the outcomes and reasoning of the awards by the means 
296. See Reilly, supra note 120, at 71.
297. See Blackshaw, supra note 196, at 14.
298. See id.
299. See generally DIXIT, supra note 15, at 29 (explaining that international arbitration can 
be used in international transactions to reduce the risks of favored treatment of parties by their 
domestic courts). 
300. See Landes & Posner, supra note 163, at 236.
301. See id. at 248 (explaining that arbitrators, which are paid by private parties to resolve
their disputes, have no incentives to produce precedents that would provide guidance to future 
parties by incurring additional unpaid costs). 
302. See id. at 248–49.
303. The database of CAS awards is available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/jurisprudence/archive.html.  As of December 2016, CAS made about 330 football-
related decisions publicly available.  CAS Bulletin is published twice a year and is available at 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/bulletin/cas-bulletin.html. 
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of social connections and gossips.304  Hence, even unpublished awards do 
not decrease the public good effect of adjudication. 
* * *
In summary, FIFA's private order offers its incumbents advantages 
that alternatives cannot deliver.  Some of them, such as increased certainty, 
are in the interests of all involved actors, whereas others, such as 
commitment to enforce contractual practices or training compensation 
awards, are more preferred by sophisticated actors (i.e. clubs and 
prominent footballers) and small clubs, respectively.  This, though not 
allowing to state plainly that the private order is maximizing the welfare 
of all involved actors, also does not justify arguments for abandoning the 
current system in favor of state laws.  To the contrary, the arguments 
demonstrate the private order's value. 
VI. FACTORS THAT MADE THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE LEGAL ORDER
FEASIBLE 
Many other industries, where, similar to football, employee-specific 
capital is important, suffer from the application of rigid formal law that 
cannot be tailored to the needs of the industry.  And although some have 
succeeded in obtaining the privilege of a closed group where non-members 
are excluded from participation in the industry—consider, for instance, 
laws requiring practicing lawyers to join a local bar association—they 
have fallen short of establishing own rules of conduct to replace formal 
state-made law.  This is where these industries and their membership 
associations differ from FIFA.  The question then is why FIFA has been 
successful in creating its own private legal system, whereas others, such 
as bar associations (or associations of law firms), failed or even did not try 
to establish something equivalent? 
In brief, this can be explained by the combination of three factors.  
First, FIFA started as a small network to organize international 
competitions, develop commonly-shared fixture calendar, and harmonize 
the rules of the game across borders.  This network was not costly to 
manage.  Afterwards, FIFA was able to build on this foundation by adding 
304. See Bernstein, The Diamond Industry, supra note 10, at 151 (making a similar
argument for the members of the Diamond Dealers Club when it comes to "new and unusual 
cases"). 
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more powers.  Second, all this was made possible by the reluctance of 
states to intervene in regulating sports in general and football in particular.  
Hence, supported by or benefitting from the special treatment of sports by 
nation states, FIFA filled the regulatory gap and strengthened its status as 
a private regulator.  Third, in order to attract public interest football needed 
its own rules and regulations more than many other sectors.  As a result, 
the new order has departed from traditional laws governing other fields in 
many ways.  The remainder of this section discusses each factor in more 
details. 
Aviram's theory for the formation of private legal orders explains 
that successful private legal systems do not form "out of the blue"; they 
build upon an existing basis, "typically by regulating norms that are not 
very costly to enforce" and then keep on growing and taking over more 
expensive norms as they mature and become ready to enforce those.305 
The more they develop, the more benefits there are to members of the 
network and the more incentives to belong to it.306  Thus the network will 
be able to take the enforcement of yet costlier norms on board.307 
FIFA's development fits into this framework.  The organization 
stems from gentlemen's agreements that filled the void of international 
sports regulation then in place, and that benefited from a first-mover 
advantage.308  Since there was little previous regulation in place, setting 
up a new organization provided membership benefits that had not been 
available before.  The role of the new body was to oversee international 
games and competitions with the participation of its handful members' 
national teams.  The original founders of FIFA were a few core people 
driven by a shared motivation for establishing the new organization.309 
305. See Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 14, 20–23 (2004) [hereinafter A Paradox]; Amitai 
Aviram, Path Dependence in the Development of Private Ordering, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 29, 
48–49, 50–53 (2014). 
306. See Aviram, A Paradox, supra note 305, at 21–22.
307. See id.
308. Henk Eric Meier & Borja García, Protecting Private Transnational Authority Against
Public Intervention: FIFA's Power over National Governments, 93 PUB. ADMIN'N 890, 893–94 
(2015). 
309. See Alan Tomlinson, FIFA and the Men Who Made It, SOCCER & SOC'Y, no. 1, 2000,
at 55–59.  The small number of member associations and close ties between them fostered 
decision-making and enforcement.  Even nowadays FIFA remains at high levels a network of 
people who know one another fairly well and are willing to do one another favors.  See Guillermo 
Jorge, Fixing FIFA: The Experience of the Independent Governance Committee, 21 SW. J. INT'L 
L. 165, 167 (2014).
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This, coupled with the obvious need to organize international fixtures, 
provided incentives for complying with FIFA's rulings. 
After World War I, FIFA strengthened its role by staging World 
Cups—the extremely popular and lucrative world championships for 
men's national teams of different countries.310  Since only members were 
eligible for participation, FIFA membership increased in its appeal for 
both the incumbent and prospective members.  The success of these 
tournaments meant that FIFA could make use of an already existing 
network, thus overcoming initial collective action problems, to broaden its 
rule-making powers.  As it grew, more and more countries saw network 
benefits in joining.  FIFA was thus able to regulate more exclusively and 
add the control mechanism, i.e. the ability to control interactions within 
the field, to its toolbox.  Soon enough the network benefits its system 
provided—such as the rights to the games, the right to participate in 
tournaments, the rights of countries to host the tournaments, and even the 
notion that having one's team "recognized" meant having one's 
sovereignty recognized311—combined with the negative consequences of 
staying outside of the unrivalled network led to FIFA's transformation 
from a body responsible for a mere organization of international 
tournaments into a full-blown membership association regulating almost 
all aspects of organized football. 
FIFA then made sure to keep its regulatory monopoly position in the 
field.  To fend off state intervention, FIFA invoked the doctrine of 
"autonomy of sport";312 to discourage those within the network to turn to 
formal courts outside of the private legal order, FIFA revoked the network 
benefits of those who violated the private legal rules.313  Now that FIFA is 
thus embedded, its network benefits are inescapable and it is, thanks to its 
established structure, presumably still less costly than the alternative 
solutions. 
310. The inaugural FIFA World Cup was held in Uruguay in 1930 with the participation 
of thirteen national teams.  Earlier attempts to organize an international competition among 
national teams were not successful.  See Tomlinson, supra note 309, at 57.  Not only has the 
World Cup become one of the biggest media spectacles, but participation in it is a big boost to 
a national pride and, for some, even a demonstration of a nation's power and success.  Not 
surprisingly, it is considered the "greatest asset" of FIFA.  Id. at 55.  See also Frances Robinson 
& Gabriele Steinhauser, Flemings Battle Walloons in Belgium, but They'll Always Have the 
World Cup, WALL ST. J., Jun. 26, 2014. 
311. See Meier & García, supra note 308, at 894.
312. See Meier & García, supra note 308, at 894–95.
313. See supra Part IV.B.
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This was made possible by the reluctance of states to intervene in 
the governance of football.  Just 40 years ago, FIFA was largely focused 
on organizing the game across the globe; it was a small gentlemen's club 
with a staff of 11, far from politics, which produced little cash.314  Since 
then, it has evolved into a powerful organization generating billions of 
dollars in annual revenues through sales of media and marketing rights; 
now it employs hundreds.315  In a similar way evolved the attention of 
state-related bodies to football.  Pure sporting interests that had nothing to 
do with economic activity were exempted from formal regulation.316  
Accordingly, sports were not affected by state intervention and developed 
independently.  But gradually, along with the increasing commercial 
dimension, state intervention has grown.317  The period of independence 
allowed FIFA to create its private legal order that co-existed along with 
formal law, notwithstanding many conflicts.  Later, it became so strong 
and vested that new interest from state-related bodies had only limited 
effect on it.318 
The absence of state interest to intervene in the organization of 
sports, while explaining the ability of FIFA to develop its own legal order, 
does not answer the question why football needed alternative governance 
rules.  The history of the development of player transfer rules sheds light 
on this.  In brief, football's interest in securing contractual stability is not 
unique, but the stakes were much higher in football than in most of other 
fields.319  Combined with an already existing network and green light to 
314. See HEIDI BLAKE & JONATHAN CALVERT, THE UGLY GAME: THE QATARI PLOT TO
BUY THE WORLD CUP 17 (2016); ANDREW JENNINGS, FOUL! THE SECRET WORLD OF FIFA: 
BRIBES, VOTE RIGGING AND TICKET SCANDALS 9, 19–21 (2008). 
315. See JENNINGS, supra note 314, at 49, 52.  See also Matthew Futterman, Aruna
Viswanatha, & Christopher M. Matthews, FIFA Corruption Allegations Reach Into Soccer's 
Highest Levels, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2015. 
316. See Richard Parrish, Football's Place in the Single European Market, SOCCER & 
SOC'Y, no. 1, 2002, at 14; Van Rompuy, supra note 186, at 180. 
317. See Parrish, supra note 316, at 14; Van Rompuy, supra note 186, at 180.
318. See, e.g., Parrish, supra note 316, at 5–8 (describing post-Bosman negotiations
between football governing bodies and the European Commission which resulted in a 
compromise reform of player transfer rules—a settlement that "was widely interpreted as a 
favorable" for FIFA and UEFA). 
319. Contrast the following narrative with the evolution of employee mobility in
investment banking.  As any intensive human knowledge-based sector, investment banks are 
interested in maintaining stable employment: if employee turnover is weak, banks can invest in 
the development of industry-specific skills and, in addition, do not need to fear information leaks 
and client losses associated with the departure of key employees.  Historically, the traditional 
investment bank's partnership structure weakened incentives for employee mobility, but this has 
changed during the last decades.  See Morrison & Wilhelm, supra note 30, at 397–99 (explaining 
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self-organize with minimum public intervention, this led to the 
development of the order as we know it now. 
Modern player transfer rules originated in England more than 100 
years ago.  The northern clubs—Blackburn Rovers F.C., Aston Villa F.C., 
and Notts County F.C.—dominated English football in the late 19th 
century.320  Although professional football officially was not recognized, 
the big clubs had for some time been in a position to pay their players or 
offer other benefits.321  The Football Association eventually embraced the 
reality and recognized professional players, but, in exchange, introduced 
transfer rules, according to which professionals had to register with their 
clubs every year and could move to other club only at the end of each 
season; old clubs could not prevent such moves.322  In other words, clubs 
could commit players maximum for one year and had to renew their 
contracts annually.  Accordingly, rich clubs from large cities could attract 
the best talent from clubs located in smaller towns by offering higher 
salaries.323  For example, when Nottingham Forest F.C., then a small 
regional club, tried to obtain an injunction preventing one of its players 
from moving to Blackburn Rovers, both the first instance and the appeal 
courts refused to offer support.324 
that opaque individual performances of investment bankers discouraged competitors from 
soliciting laterals, which resulted in bankers spending their entire careers in one bank; the 
development of measures of individual performance and the following rise of "star" culture have 
changed this).  Accordingly, investment banks lacked incentives for lobbying special 
employment laws.  They have more reasons to do this nowadays and have relied on non-compete 
provisions to limit employee mobility.  The effectiveness of these clauses though, given hostility 
of courts in many jurisdictions, is dubious.  See Sujeet Indap & James Fontanella-Khan, Battle 
of the Bankers, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 25, 2016 (describing a lawsuit filed by Perella Weinberg 
Partners L.P., a boutique M&A firm, against its former four bankers alleging their intention to 
"steal the practice group that PWP had spent millions of dollars and over seven years of effort 
to develop."  This rare public move put the long-established practice of including non-
solicitation and non-competition clauses into the bankers' employment contracts under judicial 
scrutiny, thus threatening to undermine the industry's traditional way of functioning.  As 
explained by one attorney, even if the legality of these clauses is controversial, they are an 
effective tool to discourage employee mobility because "[t]he simple threat of litigation around 
these acts as an instrument to inflict pain on counter-parties with fewer resources."). 
320. Half the 12 teams competing in the English Football League's 1888–89 inaugural
season were from the north and half from the midlands; none was from south of Birmingham.  
Long after, football remained "a game of industrial England."  Football Geography: A Country 
of Two Halves, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 2016. 
321. See David McArdle, Ignoring the Inevitable: Reflections on the Intervention of the
English Courts in Football's Contract Disputes, 2 EUR. SPORTS MGMT Q. 264, 265 (2002). 
322. See id. at 265–66.
323. See id. at 267.
324. See id. at 266 (describing the facts of Radford v. Campbell decided in 1890).
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After the English Football League was expanded to include smaller 
clubs, the football authorities decided to remove the imbalance between 
big and small clubs in order to promote competition with the resulting 
excitement and unpredictability.325  A tournament dominated constantly 
by a handful of teams would hardly attract nation-wide interest.  In the 
absence of support from the judiciary, the football authorities had to take 
action themselves: from the start of the 1893/94 season, the new transfer 
rules required each player to be registered with a club and once he had 
registered, he could not play for any other club without the permission of 
the old club.326  This was the precursor of the pre-Bosman system of 
transfer rules. 
This story shows how important competition in football is.  Only at 
first glance football teams are competing with each other.  When it comes 
to attracting audiences, football is in a huge competition.  Its rivals are not 
only other sporting events, but the entertainment industry in general.327  As 
a result, ensuring strong competition among the teams is crucial for 
maintaining and increasing the beautiful game's audience.  In other 
industries, the competition, as a rule, is internal.  For example, lawyers and 
law firms traditionally have been competing with other lawyers and law 
firms, rather than with bankers or auditors, or even with more remote 
specialties, such as journalists.  Even though contractual stability would 
benefit law firms, the stakes are thus lower.  Clients can afford having a 
stable list of top law firms or the Big Four auditing firms, but such 
consistency would most likely endanger the position of football as one of 
the most popular entertainments.  This can explain why football authorities 
are so interested in creating conditions that would keep the game 
competitive.  Since such conditions are not offered by public legal 
systems, football authorities step in by developing their own rules of the 
game. 
VII. CONCLUSION
States and supra-national organizations are far from being the sole 
suppliers of behavior-governing institutions.  Scholars have documented 
325. See id. at 267.
326. See id.
327. For the review of literature arguing in favor and against viewing sports as operating
in a larger entertainment market see Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573, footnote 2 (2015). 
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numerous examples where non-state actors develop institutions that 
support order.  These privately-created legal orders often function 
successfully in the shadow of or without state-made laws.  FIFA is yet 
another example of a private actor that has established its own rules and 
regulations and has designed sophisticated dispute resolution and 
enforcement systems for these rules.  This private legal order has 
succeeded in governing the behavior of the involved actors by keeping 
them away from regular courts.  The reason, as we show, is the ability of 
the order to offer what other governance modes, including state-backed 
public orders, could not. 
One implication of this study is that FIFAGate, a recent money 
laundering and fraud conspiracy case under investigation by both the 
United States Department of Justice and the Swiss authorities, should not 
become a pretext for criticizing everything related to FIFA.  FIFA's 
administrative structure, certainly, needs reforms that will limit future 
mismanagement and corruption risks.328  But the scandal and the resulting 
reforms do not necessarily mandate changes in the entire private legal 
order.  So far, the reform calls have focused on the administrative side of 
FIFA: reducing corruption risks by empowering professional staff, rather 
than top FIFA officials, to take commercial decisions; strengthening 
gender diversity among top officials; limiting maximum terms of their 
service, including for the FIFA's president; and increasing transparency.329  
The rules that regulate relations among different actors involved in 
football-related activities are not in the limelight.  Nevertheless, further 
calls to increase state intervention in regulating football-related activities, 
which can be leveraged by corruption allegations, cannot be ruled out. 
Moreover, even in the absence of such calls, a shift in exogenous 
conditions—such as negative public perception of FIFA and continuous 
external threats—may weaken the self-enforcing mechanisms of the 
private legal order, thereby leading to its demise.  This study implies that, 
unless a better alternative that meets the specific needs of the various 
328. See, e.g., Jorge, supra note 309, at 165–66 (arguing that FIFA combines enormous
economic and social influence with very little constraints imposed by its "rather amateur 
governance structure"). 
329. See, e.g., Ralph Atkins, European Football Official to Head FIFA World Governing
Body, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 27, 2016; Keir Radnedge, FIFA Faces Uncertain Future as 
Carrard Unveils Reforms, WORLD SOCCER, Jan. 2016, at 18–19; Keir Radnedge, Infantino, the 
Man, WORLD SOCCER, Apr. 2016, at 14; Joshua Robinson, FIFA Elects Gianni Infantino to 
Succeed Sepp Blatter as President, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2016. 
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groups of involved actors is found, there should be limits to external 
intervention in football-related matters. 
Efforts should instead focus on identifying and dealing with some 
inefficiencies in the FIFA's private order.  It is here that state involvement 
may help private orders to improve.  One instance of such inefficiency 
may be the well-known practice of including excessively high buyout 
clauses, at the insistence of clubs, in contracts with athletes.330  This 
practice, effective in discouraging early contract termination though it may 
be, comes at the cost of deterring efficient breaches of contracts.331  Thus, 
FIFA's internal dispute resolution bodies and CAS may consider 
developing a practice of enforcing contractually agreed buyout clauses 
only if they reflect the real replacement value of the concerned player.  
Note that in jurisdictions where liquidated damages clauses are 
enforceable by state courts, the pre-agreed amount of damage cannot be 
arbitrary; rather, it has to be the expected approximation of a possible 
damage.332  Such practice, at least at the beginning, may give the parties 
stimulus for speculative litigation, but along with the developing "case 
law" on the appropriate amounts of buyout clauses the incentives of the 
parties for filing speculative complaints with decision-making bodies will 
be corrected. 
330. See, e.g., Matuzalem, supra note 82, para. 36 ("it is a known fact that these [buyout]
amounts are always set at a level far higher than the effective value of the player concerned"). 
See also supra note 110 (reporting the amount of the compensation for unilateral termination of 
the contract agreed by Real Madrid Club de Fútbol and its Croatian player Luka Modric). 
331. For an argument on efficient breaches of contracts see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 149–51 (8th ed. 2011); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an 
Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 561–62 (1977). 
332. See supra note 286.
